

ON THE QUESTION OF THE POSSIBILITY TO REPLACE THE HUMAN WITH TECHNOLOGY IN THE CREATIVE PROCESS

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Abstract

In this article, the contemporary cultural state, which is shifting toward the posthumanist paradigm, is analyzed through the lens of creation by mainly focusing on a philosophical reflection of artistic creation. The analysis considers the relevance of an emerging and increasingly firmly established view in the cultural context structured by posthumanist ideas—namely, that the rapid developments in artificial intelligence (AI) can provide a viable replacement for humans as creators in the creative process and artistic creation. It demonstrates that such an approach cannot be justified. This is because the creative process in general, and artistic creation in particular, are enabled by the ontological integrity of the human as an entity, which it receives by its nature, and on which the status of the human as a creator is based on. Such an ontological integrity of the human, which is manifested through the creative act as a unique union of the constituting human elements of perfection and vulnerability, and which reveals the equal importance of these elements for the origination and development of the creative process, consequently, cannot be attributed to technology in principle.

Keywords

posthumanism, transhumanism, creation, art, human, technology

1. Introduction

Since 1927, American news magazine *Time* annually announces the person or group of people of the year as those who had the greatest influence on the development of the world that year. The list of nominees is exhaustive. It includes eminent politicians and religious leaders, scientists and inventors, representatives of certain social classes, human rights activists, and even those individuals who, from a broader historical perspective, today are rightly regarded as humanity's greatest tyrants. However, the

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cover of the magazine that appeared in 1983 was completely different from the previous ones. It can now be reasonably stated that the first cover of that year is visually marked by a paradigmatic shift to a new cultural state in which we currently live. That year, *Time* did not award the nomination to a human being, but to a machine. A computer was announced as the machine of the year. As was stated by the magazine's publisher John A. Meyers (1983, p. 3), at the time, "[s]everal human candidates might have represented 1982, but none symbolized the past year more richly, or will be viewed by history as more significant, than a machine: the computer." This main idea of the publisher was clearly reflected in the selected headline of the magazine, "The Computer Moves In." The headline referred to the fact that a new artificial thing is entering people's lives, fundamentally changing their existential conditions, as well as that the relationship between humans and other entities constituting reality will have to be radically rethought.

In this regard, Ihab Hassan has surpassed both time and the *Time*. In 1977, Hassan published his well-known article "Prometheus as a Performer. Toward a Posthumanist Culture?". This agenda-like article and its conceptual effects are beginning to be fully realized theoretically and clearly observed in practice only nowadays. Hassan encouraged us to discuss humanity entering a new existential state. Here, the previously prevailing dualistic way of thinking, stemming from classical philosophical thought and intensively manifested in the humanistic-oriented project of modernity, which in turn emphasized the *central* ontological and ethical position of the human and grounded the opposition between entities constituting reality (e.g., human and technology, human and animal, etc.), will have to be substituted by thinking that instead reveals and represents its *integratedness*, or its *hybrid* nature. At the same time, it encouraged us to look in a new way at the ontological position of the human and its relation to other entities, as well as to re-examine the theoretical and practical attitude that, by employing the terminology of Wolfgang Iser (2017), could be described as an "anthropic axiom", characterized by the humanistic idea of the exceptionality and uniqueness of the human.

All these events, aimed at a rethinking of the ontological and ethical status of the human as an entity, are enabled by the posthumanist paradigm shift and, accordingly, the formation and emergence of a posthumanist culture based on it. Today, the manifestations of this culture can be observed in various debates. For example, starting with the widely discussed question of whether animals should be considered as legal subjects in the same way as humans are, and ending with the no less attention-grabbing question of whether it is reasonable to grant citizenship to artificial intelligence, i.e. an attribute that belonged exclusively to humans, until Saudi Arabian authorities decided to recognize the humanoid robot Sophia as a citizen of their country. However, even acknowledging the undoubted importance of these discussions in constituting new perspectives of human conceptualization and, at the same time, their self-comprehension, it should be admitted that the most radical form of the rethinking of the human unfolds in those discussions where, through the lens of evolving technological possibilities, the phenomenon of creation and art is analyzed. It is because here the fundamental question arises, which, in its turn, is not just oriented toward elucidating whether other entities in the world can be

meaningfully compared with or equated to the human. This question, foremost, is an attempt to perceive whether humans, positing in a posthumanist manner that they are only beings among other beings, can be actually replaced by other entities even in the very existential area often defined as *spiritual*, and which, to our day, has been solely reserved for God and the human—i.e., in creation. Regarding the latter, this article, through the reflection of the founding premises of the phenomenon of creation, attempts to ascertain whether the prevailing attitude in the posthumanist cultural context—that rapidly evolving technology can actually replace the human in the creative process, including artistic creation—is relevant

2. Posthumanism and the Reconsideration of the Status of Technology

Hassan is a thinker who undoubtedly gave a strong theoretical impetus to the process of radically rethinking reality and the human as an inseparable part thereof. Also, Hassan introduced the concept of *posthumanism* into the field of social and human sciences, specifically denoting this process. Today, there are many prominent posthumanist theorists, such as Donna Haraway, N. Katherine Hayles, Neil Badmington, Rosi Braidotti, or Francesca Ferrando, who, with their original works, greatly contributed to the development of posthumanist thinking. From this list of theorists, which admittedly is by no means exhaustive and could easily be expanded upon, Haraway stands out exceptionally. She is the author of the famous essay *A Cyborg Manifesto*, published in 1985. This essay could be reasonably treated as a landmark text of posthumanist anthropology. In it, reflecting on the history of the interaction between humans and machines, Haraway explicated that the human is intimately related to the social context, which in turn—although it has always been in such a way, however, nowadays it is becoming much more easily observed—is technologically mediated. In this essay, Haraway demonstrated that human nature is constituted and determined by technology, and therefore being human simultaneously means being a cyborg. As she herself claims (2016, p. 7), “[b]y the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism—in short, cyborgs. The cyborg is our ontology [...] .”

From an ethical point of view, Haraway’s analysis not only became a strong theoretical inspiration for criticizing the idea of the ontological autonomy of the human as an entity, inherited from classical anthropology, but has also a role in questioning this fundamental idea to form new models of the interrelationship between humans and other entities of reality, recognizing the latter’s much greater importance than previously thought. Haraway’s idea of human *cyborgity* is based on the fundamental assumption that the so-called *exceptional* human existence, or human *superiority*, could, in principle, be created or acquired only through the process of hybridization, such as the convergence of the human and technology. The history of humankind itself attests most clearly to the validity of this assumption. The myth about Prometheus and fire is by no means just fiction. Hassan, in his abovementioned article, refers to Prometheus not by accident. History makes it clear that humans have always been Promethean, or performative, in the sense that they never reconciled themselves to their present existence and always wished to

transform it according to their own will. However, like Prometheus, who wanted to improve the condition of humanity and who stole the fire from the gods, they did not do it alone, but with the help of technology. It is enough to take a look at the very origins of humanity. Fire, just like in the myth of Prometheus, was one of the most important technologies that had brought homo sapiens to power, i.e., which helped to *purify* them from the ranks of other beings close to their species, including other human species (and destroying these other beings in the process), and, at the same time, gave them a taste of what it means to master the world, which has not been forgotten until now, as demonstrated by Yuval Noah Harari in his well-known book *Sapiens* (2015).

From a broader historical and cultural perspective, such a reflection on the human species enables us to state that the secret of human weakness has always been hidden within human strength. Looking at this secret from a philosophical standpoint, it can be ascertained that it was first brought to light by the ontological deconstruction of the human as an entity, carried out in a postmodern and later posthumanist manner. The aforementioned process was directed at the explication of the hybrid nature of human strength, which made it possible to consolidate the idea of human supremacy, demonstrating its inseparable dependence on other entities. After rejecting the idea of a hybrid human nature, or denying the fact of human *cyborgity*, i.e. depriving the human of the symbolic Promethean fire, which in the historical process manifests itself as technological advancement, there is reason to ask: what remains of human strength, and, at the same time, what remains of the human as an entity? In this way, could the human not be returned again—even if only hypothetically—to that insignificant existential state of an ordinary biological species among other biological species, where they once existed and from where they always strived so persistently to escape?

That these kinds of questions arise from a deconstructive strategy of thinking are by no means just mind games but a response to current affairs, is most clearly demonstrated by the increasing interest in technology. On the one hand, technology is treated as an inseparable part of human nature, or at least an existential attribute accompanying it. On the other hand, it is admitted that technology cannot be equated to the human after all (this is also asserted by certain currents of thought in contemporary philosophy, such as new materialism or object-oriented ontology) and, therefore, it is (at least potentially) in opposition to the human. The fact that technology has always co-existed with humans and that it has a constitutive importance for humanness itself by no means suggests that technology is, at least from a human perspective, neutral. It would be more accurate to say that technology is ambiguous. It means that in relation to the human, technology can appear either as a devoted servant, always ready to improve human existence in every possible way, or, on the contrary, as a fierce tyrant, who can turn human existence into unbearable suffering at any moment or even end it altogether. Thus, what applies to fire also applies, in principle, to any other technology that significantly affects the human being: it is both a tool and a hazard. This profound and seemingly undeniable ambiguity is perfectly conveyed in an artistic form by the digital 3D sculpture with the rather Promethean name *Roots of Fire* (2021) by contemporary artist Adam

Martinakis. The artwork, created in 2013 and reworked in 2021, depicts a burnt bust of a human, encouraging viewers to ask themselves whether the fire that burns the bust is internal or external to it.

This question, at the theoretical level, is most clearly expressed through intensifying considerations of how the relationship between humans and technology will develop in the near future. On the one hand, it is admitted that a human exists through technological expansion, and it is doubtful that it could and should be changed. On the other hand, it is widely recognized that, nowadays, rapidly evolving technology cannot only help enhance the human, but also make the human (or reveal it to be) almost a completely powerless being, irreversibly surpassing it. In the field of transhumanism studies, which is closely related to the studies of posthumanism, this conceptual opposition is embodied in the well-known separation between the views of transhumanists and bioconservatives. The former emphasize the hitherto unknown opportunities for human development arising from technological expansion, which, as, for example, Max More (1990) argued for quite a long time, will allow people to create a paradise on earth, moving from human to transhuman and, at last, to a posthuman state. The latter, in turn, emphasizes the fact that technological expansion poses enormous existential threats to humanity, which it has never faced before, and treats this expansion, as well as transhumanist ideas that inspire it, like Francis Fukuyama (2004) has tended to do, as the most dangerous thing in the world.

There is really no need to make a lot of effort to prove the benefits of technology to people and humanity. As already stated in this article, technological development was indeed the decisive factor that enabled the establishment of the human species on a global scale. Nevertheless, even this recognition in no way eliminates the earlier mentioned ambiguous nature of technology, which, in turn, allows explicating the creative and, at the same time, destructive potential of technology. Representations of the latter potential can be found not only in those works of academia that critically assess the project of transhumanism, but also in a much wider social audience reaching, Hollywood-produced suspense movies echoing the old Frankensteinian motif and depicting a variety of apocalyptic situations arising precisely from technology turning against humans.

It should be noted that regardless of how the relationship between human and technology is presented (through the lens of creativity or destructivity), technology, as long as this relationship is recognized as relevant, is treated as *setting* the human existence. The only difference is that, in one case, technology is viewed as having a positive influence on *setting* human existence, and, in the other, as a negative one. However, there are far more radical perspectives on the assessment of technology, ones oriented toward its autonomy. From this point of view, it would be more appropriate to define the technology not as *setting*, but as *replacing*. The difference between setting and replacing can be better understood by comparing the two movies *Transcendence* and *Ex Machina*, which have received wide acclaim both in academic circles and the wider public. Using vivid apocalyptic imagery, the film *Transcendence* (Pfister, 2014) demonstrates the fierce struggle of humans against an AI supercomputer that wants to remake the world—or *set it* according to its own will—

to a degree of perfection incomprehensible to humans. In *Ex Machina* (Garland, 2014), there is no such distinctive apocalyptic imagery, except for a few situations at the end of the film. Here, in a luxurious villa separated from the world, a secretly developed robot operated by AI, helped by another robot, kills its creator, outwits the creator's assistant, leaving him locked in the villa to perish, while it, putting on clothes that do not allow itself to be distinguished from ordinary people, escapes to freedom, starting an independent life in the world and remaining unnoticed by others, thus *replacing* the human.

It has to be recognized that the discourse underlying such a treatment of technology, which proclaims that the human can existentially be replaced by another entity, i.e., technology, is still poorly developed. Perhaps it is so precisely because of its much more radical nature. To this discourse can reasonably be attributed all the views that point to the well-known fact that technology can successfully replace a human on a corporeal level, for example, in completing certain physical tasks. Nevertheless, in its most radical form, this discourse reveals itself when paying attention to another phenomenon arising from the mental dimension. The latter phenomenon is constituted by considerations about technology becoming superior to the human, traditionally speaking, in the *spiritual* field, i.e., in that realm which is defined through the creative capacity, and from which, as it has long been believed, arises and in which lies the very essence of humanness, as well as the uniqueness and superiority of the human as an entity compared to other entities.

On the one hand, it encourages a fundamental reconsideration of the concept of the human, inherited from classical yet still culturally dominant thinking. In the words of Thomas Aquinas (1979), it proclaims that

[f]or all other animals, nature has prepared food, hair as a covering, teeth, horns, claws as means of defense or at least speed in flight, while man alone was made without any natural provisions for these things. Instead of all these, man was endowed with reason, by the use of which he could procure all these things for himself by the work of his hands.
(p. 4)

On the other hand, it encourages reconsidering the relationship between humans and technology based on a human conceptualization, ascribing to technology constitutive, but in fact only instrumental importance in the development of humanity. This overlooks the possibility of the autonomy of technology itself. However, nowadays, this possibility, spreading as a fundamental challenge to the idea of the uniqueness of the human, is becoming increasingly evident and emphasized, and this is most clearly observed in attempts to newly conceptualize the creative process, in order to reveal the creative capacity not only in the human.

3. The Ontological Structure of the Human as the Fundamental Premise of Their Irreplaceability in Creation

In Thomas Aquinas's comparison of humans and animals, emphasis is placed on the distinction between humanness and animalness. It is noteworthy that Thomas

Aquinas, in principle, grounds this distinction on the basis of *technological* differences. These differences—admittedly from a human perspective—are not insurmountable. As Thomas Aquinas clearly points out, the warmth provided by fur or security provided by the sharpness of claws, i.e., the qualities that animals obtain from their structure as received by nature, but which, in turn, humans do not possess, is possible for humans to *procure*. Or, to put it in other words, humans are able to do all the things they require to provide for their existence due to their inherent rationality, i.e., because of that natural quality which, at least according to the attitude of classical thinkers (alongside Thomas Aquinas, we could also mention such eminent thinkers as St. Augustine, Aristotle, Plato, etc.), none other animals possess. Thus, humans are capable of creating technology and producing technological effects that they need and that some animals receive by nature. Moreover, people are capable of using their creativity to surpass nature significantly. At the very beginning of the 20th century, the flyer, or the prototype of the airplane, built by the Wright brothers, who, realized in practice the mythical dream of Icarus to fly, could not compete with many birds in flying speed. Today, not even the fastest bird, the peregrine falcon, can compare with an ordinary passenger plane, let alone any the fastest jet aircraft, such as the Lockheed SR-71 *Blackbird*.

Such success has allowed people to believe for a long time that only they, possessing rationality, or a divine creative spark, are capable of engaging in intellectual activity and creativity that allows them to master, in accordance with their own will, the world and the entities within it. However, in the middle of the 20th century, when computer scientist John McCarthy coined the term *artificial intelligence*, this conviction began to be increasingly doubted. The most significant practical event proving the validity of doubting the uniqueness of humans in the mental dimension occurred in the late 20th century, when a computer won a game of chess against a human opponent. In 1997, *Deep Blue*, a chess computer developed by IBM, defeated world chess champion Garry Kasparov. For the sake of truth, it should be added that this computer's design included accumulated human knowledge and experience playing chess, which is why the victory it achieved can be reasonably treated as still achieved with the assistance of a human. However, in 2017, the self-learning *AlphaZero* program, developed by the AI research company DeepMind, defeated the most powerful chess engine at that time *StockFish 8*, which, similar to *Deep Blue*, was made on the basis of human knowledge and experience in chess, thus proving its indisputable superiority over humans in this game. Two years before *AlphaZero* achieved its victories in chess, the self-learning *AlphaGo* program, which was also developed by DeepMind, did it in Go, another game requiring enormous intellectual resources. In 2015, *AlphaGo* defeated the European champion Fan Hui, and in 2016, it proved its prowess against legendary Go player and multi-time world champion Lee Sedol. Shortly after this loss, Lee decided to end his professional career basing his decision on the fact that the AI in this game cannot be defeated (Pranam, 2019).

The victories achieved by technology over humans, even if admittedly only on a gaming level, cannot really be compared to any of its other victories, which until then were effectively confined to the physical realm. This incomparability stems from the fact that in winning games of chess and Go, technology has won in the area from

which the very essence of humanness has traditionally been derived. For a long time, people could see, for example, how technology like a crane can easily lift the heaviest things that no human arms could. However, it had nothing to do with the essence of humanness, which, as has been proven over the centuries, primarily in the works of the most eminent philosophers, extends to the realm of rationality. Consequently, it did not have the same impact as the events that happened during the aforementioned games. Through these games, the possibility of the superiority of technology over the human in the mental dimension was revealed in practice. It, in its turn, enabled the emergence of a new posthumanist cultural consciousness, which reflects and recognizes not only the *instrumental*, but the autonomous status of technology as well.

Most obviously, this consciousness, since in its very essence it was directed to the rethinking of the phenomenon of creation, raising the question whether it is really reasonable to treat the human as the only being in the world embedded with rationality and creative power, began to spread most distinctly through the reflection of the phenomenon of art. Here, too, the question of the creative status of technology was considered in its purest form. It is not only about the issue of using technology in creation. There is no doubt that technology has been used in this process, including artistic creation, since time immemorial. Prehistoric rock carvings and cave paintings, which are considered to be the first artistic works conveying the self-comprehension and worldview of the humans of that time, were created with the assistance of various technologies, e.g., scrapers, charcoal, etc. Today, there are completely different and even more diverse technologies, some of which were not even developed directly for artistic purposes (e.g., genetic engineering), and, consequently, we have completely unique forms of art, such as bioart, which, in turn, by incorporating techno-scientific knowledge into the process of creation, clearly demonstrates how widely—from the medical to the artistic—technology can be employed.¹

Otherwise, as long as technology is reflected on and presented only as a means of creating art or new forms of art through broadening our imagination, for example, as it is, in fact, done in the *Transhumanist Arts Statement* (2003) prepared by Natasha Vita-More in 1982 and revisited in 2003, all these reflections and presentations, in principle, remain within the conceptual framework of traditionally (or humanistically) understood creation, and the conceptual content of the posthumanist paradigm and its practical potential, allowing to consider technology not as a means of creation, but as a creator itself, consequently, are not fully disclosed. In other words, in today's cultural context, constituted by the premises of transhumanist and posthumanist thinking, the question of technological possibilities cannot be treated just as a technological question anymore, which is raised only to, for example, find out what artistic forms or ideas have been or will be allowed to emerge by developing technologies. In its essence, the mentioned question unfolds as an anthropology

¹ This diverse use of technology, which, on the one hand, testifies to the *interdisciplinary* nature of its own, and, on the other hand, the different cultural forms (such as science and art) connected through it, at the same time clearly demonstrates that it is specifically through artistic creation that the posthumanist paradigm shift, emphasizing a non-dualistic approach to reality, most evidently manifests. Stefan L. Sorgner has so far analyzed this shift and presented it most comprehensively through the lens of art in his work *Philosophy of Posthuman Art* (2022).

which challenges the conception of the creative process itself, by raising another, more fundamental question: can technology fully replace the human as a creator?

There has been a marked increase of interest both in academia and the wider public in the fact that technology is actually becoming capable of composing music, carrying out performances, drawing paintings, or writing verse. Moreover, theoretical efforts can be observed here, such as, in the case of a humanoid AI-driven robot named Ai-Da, that, although in a nuanced manner, for example, emphasizing the constitutive feature of the originality of artwork, and linking such a feature with a human capacity to surmount the sheer automatism, to shape the image of AI as an artist (Aikaterini, 2020). Nevertheless, there are studies that, on the contrary, provide basis to question the validity of attempts of presenting robots as artists. In this respect, a noteworthy, experimental study was conducted by Elze Sigute Mikalonyte and Markus Kneer (2022), where it is stated that although “people are inclined to judge AI-driven robots and human agent made paintings as art to roughly the same extent”, simultaneously “people are much less willing to consider robots as artists than humans”. It is also indicated in that study that this lesser willingness of people “can be explained in part by the fact that people are less disposed to attribute artistic intentions to robots”.²

On the one hand, it could be argued that the latter tendency reflects the commonsense view on AI claiming that—regardless of how advanced it is—in principle, it cannot be treated as a creator or as an artist simply because it, in its essence, is an artifact created by humans. This approach is clearly expressed by some scientists working on the development of AI. One of them is Saulius Keturakis (2020), who described his professional activities, oriented toward creating software that is able to write fiction, which he gave the human name of Tomas Maagi, as “writing the writer”. This commonsense attitude limits the possibility of treating a robot as a creator. Accordingly, it grounds the idea with its core belief that it is not AI that is creating works of art (even if we recognize this status for the artifacts it produces), but that works of art are created with the help of AI technology, or, to put it in other words, through using this technology.

On the other hand, even if we distance ourselves from commonsense-derived imagery and treatments of technology grounded on it, and, in turn, reflect on technology from a philosophical position, which enables us to abstract to the maximum extent of the conceptual content of technology and its autonomy, the same

² It should be noted that in the study presented herein, the research is conducted through the lens of a type of art in which exists a clear distinction between the creating subject and the created object—or the creator of art and work of art. The painter, despite the fact that each of his works can be regarded as an expression of his ideas, or a manifestation of his *spirit*, cannot be equated to a painting. It is true that once painted, a painting can exist even when the painter no longer exists. However, there are such forms of art where the distinction between the artist and the work of art is particularly obscured (or non-existent at all), such as performance art. Here, the work of art is expressed directly through its creator (performer). In this case, it might be reasonably stated that the work of art cannot be separated from the artist in principle. Taking into account the existing diversity of the types of art and its specificities, it enables us to raise the question that could become the object of future studies and which, in the broadest sense, could be formulated as follows: are robots capable of making art in all forms of art?

conclusion would nevertheless be reached; particularly, that we cannot ascribe to technology creativeness or the status of the creator, both of which are attributed to the human. In order to validate this conclusion, it is appropriate to recall the abovementioned quote by Thomas Aquinas on the difference between humanness and animalness, and, based on it, to inquire as to what, in fact, enables the act of creation. One may get the impression that the act is enabled by the exceptional rationality of the human, which, at the same time, denotes human superiority and their perfection to other beings of the world. Notwithstanding, such an impression would not be exhaustive. As it has already been mentioned, human rationality, from the perspective of Thomas Aquinas's philosophical thinking, can indeed be assessed and presented as a capacity oriented at perfection, enabling the human through the use of creativity to remake themselves and the world around them according to their own will. However, in the process of creation, an equally important constitutive or structural element, from which the inspiration of creativity or its intention originates, is what, in the most general sense, could be described as the *natural vulnerability of the human*—or their *existential insufficiency*. As Aristotle, a source of influence for Thomas Aquinas, had already observed, the human is not just like a beast or god, who, in turn, are self-sufficient (Aristotle, 1998, p.11). Due to such an ontological specificity, the human is, according to Aristotle, a political animal. Nevertheless, it could be stated even further that this ontological specificity simultaneously enables us to treat the human as an animal called or directed to creation. In order to transcend their inherent vulnerability, or to overcome the existential insufficiency, humans must create different kinds of things. Some help them to physically exist and realize themselves in the world (scientific and technological knowledge), while others provide a so-called *spiritual fundament* for making sense of this world and revealing it as a place worth existing in (religion and art).

It allows us to reasonably state that both the creative process in general and artistic creation specifically are enabled by, and the status of the human as creator is grounded upon, the inherent ontological integrity of the human as an entity. The aforementioned integrity most evidently manifests itself through the act of creation. This act exceptionally unites the constituting human elements of vulnerability and perfection, at the same time revealing the equal importance of these elements for the origination and development of the creative process. Technology, in turn, cannot be characterized by this integral ontological structure of vulnerability and perfection that constitutes the human. This is simply because technology, in its essence, unfolds purely as perfection, or as a radical opposition to vulnerability (to be convinced of this, it is enough to think about why technology is produced in the first place), and which, therefore, does not itself experience any insufficiency, but only performs the function of eliminating it, consequently unable to have creative inspiration within itself. This, on the one hand, allows for at least a partial explanation of the tendency observed by other researchers, already mentioned in this article—that people hardly tend to attribute artistic intentions to technology; on the other hand, it poses a reason to state that human replacement with technology in the creative process is not possible.

4. Conclusions

While encouraging a radical rethinking of the relationship between the entities that constitute reality, the posthumanist paradigm shift that defines today's cultural state simultaneously encourages questioning the ontological exceptionality of the human and abandoning the ethically engaged anthropic axiom about the superiority of the human prevailing through various cultural practices in respect to other entities. This process is carried out in the direction of the acknowledgment of the importance of non-human entities and the unfolding of their ontological autonomy, providing the idea of the possibility to replace humans with other entities in all cultural activities. This inevitably affects the perception and course of creation, including artistic creation. However, as the research conducted in this article demonstrates, a complete denial and rejection of the anthropic axiom is not valid. Based on the analysis carried out, it can be concluded that the objective structural-ontological differences between humans and technology, which in turn are best revealed through reflection on the phenomenon of creation, do not support the idea of ontological equivalence between humans and technology assumed in a posthumanist manner and, at the same time, clearly reveal the irreplaceability of the human, at least in certain cultural spheres (such as creativity in general and artistic creativity in particular). This main research insight can be used and developed in future research. First, and most importantly, it can be applied to a more detailed assessment of the validity of the philosophical ideas and theoretical assumptions that underpin the posthuman paradigm shift, denying the ontological specificity of the human. Secondly, based on this insight revealing the uniqueness of the human as an entity constituted by elements of vulnerability and perfection, a theoretical basis is found for a new reflection of the essential position of the transhumanism project, which is conceptually close to the field of posthuman studies, intensively denying the value of human vulnerabilities and proving the need or even the necessity of radical remaking of the current human eliminating all factors that determine their weakness as an entity by means of techno-scientific knowledge.

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