



European Revolutions and World War as Way Stations to Planetary Man: Rosenstock-Huessy's Christian Rejoinder to Spengler's *The Decline of the West*

Christian Roy

Independent Scholar, Canada

Abstract

Along with Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929), Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy (1888-1973) developed an existential Speech Thinking that he critically applied to Spengler's Decline of the West, portraying it in an early essay as evidence of "The Suicide of Europe" through a Greek posture of objective detachment. He would return to it throughout his life as a foil to the narrative "We" of living memory unfolding in the historical sequence of European Revolutions he described in several books and lectures as the working-out of second-millennium Christianity, adumbrating a third-millennium Planetary Man born of world war.

Keywords

Spengler, Oswald; Rosenstock-Huessy, Eugen; Rosenzweig, Franz; Toynbee, Arnold; Existential Thought; Philosophy of History; Philosophy of Language; Judaeo-Christianity; Revolution; War.

DOI: 10.22618/TP.PJC.V.20226.2.144.005

The PJC.V Journal is published by Trivent Publishing



This is an Open Access article distributed in accordance with the Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial (CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0) license, which permits others to copy or share the article, provided original work is properly cited and that this is not done for commercial purposes. Users may not remix, transform, or build upon the material and may not distribute the modified material (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>)

European Revolutions and World War as Way Stations to Planetary Man: Rosenstock-Huessy's Christian Rejoinder to Spengler's *The Decline of the West*

Christian Roy

Independent Scholar, Canada

Abstract

Along with Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929), Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy (1888-1973) developed an existential Speech Thinking that he critically applied to Spengler's Decline of the West, portraying it in an early essay as evidence of "The Suicide of Europe" through a Greek posture of objective detachment. He would return to it throughout his life as a foil to the narrative "We" of living memory unfolding in the historical sequence of European Revolutions he described in several books and lectures as the working-out of second-millennium Christianity, adumbrating a third-millennium Planetary Man born of world war.

Keywords

Spengler, Oswald; Rosenstock-Huessy, Eugen; Rosenzweig, Franz; Toynbee, Arnold; Existential Thought; Philosophy of History; Philosophy of Language; Judaeo-Christianity; Revolution; War.

I. Introduction: Revolutionizing Pagan Conservatism or Preserving Christianity's Revolutionary Spirit?

Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy's work *Die Europäischen Revolutionen*¹ earned him an entry (B 179.1) in Armin Mohler's classic handbook of the Conservative Revolution in Germany (1918–1932), as one of two "special cases" who hardly fit with other so-called "young-conservative" intellectuals like Oswald Spengler and early Thomas Mann.² Indeed, what figure is less typical of the Conservative Revolution, largely dominated by neopagan or antihumanist tendencies and historicist assumptions, than Rosenstock-Huessy? One may wonder why this pioneer of Jewish-Christian dialogue even figures in the Conservative Revolution's canon, beyond

¹ Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, *Die Europäischen Revolutionen: Die Volkscharaktere und Staatenbildung* (Jena: Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1931); revised editions: *Die Europäischen Revolutionen und der Charakter der Nationen* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1951, 1961); English adaptation: *Out of Revolution: Autobiography of Western Man* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1938; Norwich, VT: Argo Books, 1969; Providence, RI: Berg Publishers, 1993).

² Armin Mohler and Karl-Heinz Weissmann, *Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918-1932. Ein Handbuch* (Graz: Ares Verlag, 2005 [1950]), 496.

sharing its main publisher (Eugen Diederichs). One criterion was the cyclical sense of time implied in the astronomical etymology of Revolution, which was crucial to Rosenstock-Huessy, albeit with a twist: precisely the Cross of Reality (a phenomenological structure made manifest in the Christ event) as a fourfold set of existential coordinates whose shifting emphases, withdrawals and retrievals constantly redefined historical eras and areas, independently of any preordained sequence within each of these. Thus, unlike the palingenetic Eternal Return favoured as a paradigm by most “revolutionary conservative” authors—starting with Spengler—Revolution as Rosenstock-Huessy understood it integrated the arrow of irreversible historical time introduced by Biblical Revelation, which he translated into the series of European revolutions characterizing Christianity’s Western-centric second millennium, in contrast to both the Eastern-centric first millennium of Church history, and the final third millennium of Christianity’s incognito worldwide fulfilment in Planetary Man. For him, history was eschatological prophecy read backwards from this teleological end, revealed as the structural principle of reality by Christianity. This implied a willingness to sacrifice its historical forms and successive deformations after they had served their revolutionary purpose: transmitting that potential for new life that he aimed to conserve through all upheavals of accelerating modern history as the leading edge of a Christian future beyond them. *The Decline of the West* as portrayed by Spengler was thus neither to be deplored nor embraced in vain clinging to dissolving, revamped, or recycled historical formations and power configurations. But it did represent a serious challenge to the vision of history Rosenstock-Huessy developed as the book’s first volume was being written, so that he spent the rest of his life answering it. His Christian rejoinder to Spengler’s book, taking up similar world-historical themes in a radically different spirit, may be worth pondering as we seem to be living through a hectic, confusing phase of the decline of the West, with no clear vision of what comes next. Rosenstock-Huessy can make us think twice about any Spengler-inspired retreat into a defensive clash of civilizations, by showing how antiglobalist reflexes minimize the irreversible change wrought by Christianity, and specifically by its Western forms, in gathering the ends of the world to bring it to an end as one, for better or for worse. His post-secular take on that process as one that ends up reviving older tribal patterns in an inescapably planetary setting (as in McLuhan’s global village) also defies easy categorization within the terms of progressive ideologies. In this article, I will first situate Rosenstock-Huessy’s complex and original religious-philosophical stance over against the West’s Luciferian temptation he saw embodied in Spengler, before parsing the issues raised in his review of *The Decline of the West* in the context of the First World War as revolution, moving on to his survey of all European revolutions that culminated in it and the Second World War to make way for the advent of “Planetary Man” in the latter’s aftermath, as outlined in a postwar essay in Spengler’s memory that I will examine before my own critical look back at Rosenstock-Huessy’s Christian future in light of civilization’s doubtful prospects in the global wake of Faustian culture.

II. Putting Margaret’s Query about Religion to Mephistopheles as Faustian Man’s Tempter

Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy (1888-1973) is the lesser-known half of an intellectual tandem (bringing to mind Marx-Engels, Charbonneau-Ellul or Deleuze-Guattari) with Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929), who was induced to rediscover his Jewish faith by his friend’s attempt to convince him to convert to Protestantism, as he had done at a young age. Rosenzweig has often expressed his gratitude to Rosenstock for this pivotal July 7, 1913 *Leipziger Nachtgespräch* (“nocturnal conversation in Leipzig”) that was part of his introduction to the new “speech thinking” (*Sprachdenken*) his friend had formulated the previous year. They

would both develop it in opposition to academic philosophy, remaining in close dialogue (true to an inherently dialogical stance) as existential religious thinkers of rival yet complementary faiths, as they saw it. If their correspondence on this issue remains a touchstone of ecumenical thinking, it is usually from this document of Rosenzweig's biography that Rosenstock-Huessy is known, often cast in the unflattering role of the proselytizing assimilated Jew.³ His radical Christian existential thought has thus long failed to get the attention it deserves in its own right. As Wayne Cristaudo presents it in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*:

The greater part of Rosenstock-Huessy's work was devoted to demonstrating how speech/language, through its unpredictable fecundity, expands our powers and, through its inescapably historical forming character, also binds them. According to Rosenstock-Huessy, speech makes us collective masters of time and gives us the ability to overcome historical death by founding new, more expansive and fulfilling spaces of social-life. Rosenstock-Huessy also belonged to that post-Nietzschean revival of religious thought which included Franz Rosenzweig, Karl Barth, Leo Weismantel, Hans and Rudolf Ehrenberg, Viktor von Weizsäcker, Martin Buber, Lev Shestov, Hugo Bergmann, Florens Christian Rang, Nikolai Berdyaev, Margaret Susman, Werner Picht (all of whom were involved in the Patmos publishing house and its offshoot *Die Kreatur*) and Paul Tillich. Common to this group was the belief that religious speech, which they saw as distinctly not metaphysical, disclosed layers of experience and creativity (personal and socio-historical) which remain inaccessible to the metaphysics of naturalism.⁴

Oswald Spengler's *Decline of the West* was for Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy a paradigmatic example of the latter posture's foreclosure of the most distinctive traits of human and specifically historical experience, so that, while admiring its scope and ambition as a historian, he positioned it as a foil to argue against time and again. If Rosenstock-Huessy developed his central insights as "inimical friends" with Rosenzweig, he ascribed a symmetrical role to Oswald Spengler as a kind of "intimate enemy." If anything, as comes out mostly from his correspondence with Rosenstock's wife Margrit Huessy while reading *The Decline of the West* in 1919, Rosenzweig was even more sympathetic to "evil genius" Oswald Spengler as an ally (like Martin Heidegger later on) of the anti-academic New Thinking, and at the same time a sobering reminder of what he risked becoming as a Hegel scholar before his turn to Judaism. Rosenzweig thought *The Decline of the West* could provide a fitting substitute for the first part of his *Star of Redemption* to lay out the "honest paganism" of closed cosmologies that was a necessary first step on the way to the world thinking opened by Biblical religion. All that needed to be added to *The Decline of the West* was iotas to harness it to the cause of the New Thinking. Indeed, it has been argued that Spengler's own dialogical understanding of language as future-oriented *Verantwortung* or "response-ability" hardly differs from speech thinking⁵ (of which it may provide a legitimately "pagan" version, subsuming language under mastery as per *Der Mensch und die Technik*), despite Rosenstock's critique of Spengler as stuck in the

³ See Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, ed., *Judaism Despite Christianity. The 1916 Wartime Correspondence Between Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy and Franz Rosenzweig* (University of Chicago Press, 2011).

⁴ Wayne Cristaudo, "Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2020 Edition), <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rosenstock-huessy/>.

⁵ See Knut Martin Stünkel, "Fragen und Antworten. Spenglers Sprachphilosophie: Das Neue Denken". In A. De Winde, S. Fabr e, S. Maes, & B. Philipsen (eds.), *Tektonik der Systeme. Neulektüren von Oswald Spengler* (Heidelberg: n.p., 2016), 197-219.

scientific posture of the detached observer even of speech phenomena. Coming from a fellow German world-historian, this critique remains a formidable one, highlighting deep-seated conflicts between pagan and Judaeo-Christian approaches to life and language, space and time, as I will show in this article based largely on a search for Spengler's name in the Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy Digital Archive, turning up countless references.

Upon encountering *The Decline of the West* and writing a long review essay on it that was nonetheless left out of Manfred Schröter's collection *Der Streit um Spengler. Kritik seiner Kritiker* (1923), Eugen Rosenstock wrote his wife that its author was thinking his thoughts, "my ideas insofar as they are my own, and thus un-Christian"; it was as though Spengler (sexually) possessed Rosenstock's ideas, overpowering his own entrancement with them. Rosenstock contrasted this felt conceptual vampirism to his spousal relationship to Margrit (whose family name he would add to his own in 1925) as "my conscience, through which "the whole Reason" is compelled to obey the law, to be responsible. Of this conscience [*Gewissen*] that confronts science [*Wissen*], Spengler knows nothing," daring to claim the devil ceased to exist a hundred years back (even as he names the West after Goethe's *Faust*). But Rosenstock-Huessy sees Spengler as "my Lucifer beside me," a devil he has not produced but who had been waiting at a crossroads all along to spur him on his life's journey. The fact that Spengler appears "suddenly with adamant clarity and corporeality at this tremendous moment of decision" as "my Lucifer who has drunken my blood" is "just as strong an incarnation of the mystery as Franz's planetary belonging together with me [*Franzens planetarische Zusammengehörigkeit zu mir*]."6 It is all the more mysterious that Eugen Rosenstock always kept Franz Rosenzweig in mind as his angel to wrestle with, long beyond his early death from crippling paralysis, when we know that his friend's doubly adulterous relationship with Margrit provided the paradoxical model for the nuptial alliance between God and Man in *The Star of Redemption*. Not unlike Thomas Mann at the same post-war juncture,⁷ Rosenstock thus also spent the rest of his life wrestling with Oswald Spengler as his "evil twin," shifting to this Goethean Mephistopheles the proverbial *Gretchenfrage* to Faust about religion. For Rosenstock-Huessy viewed Spengler as the embodiment of the secular lure of "Greek" metaphysical thinking which his grammatical method was meant to counter, in a life-and-death struggle for the meaning of history, both as a discipline and as an ongoing human drama of interrelated events. He could thus append as an Envoi to the reissue of his review of *The Decline of the West's* first volume an October 12, 1945 letter to a Mr. McGrath, in which he acknowledges the attraction of Spengler's account, speaking from experience:

The Spenglerian temptation is shared by the great majority of Westerners at this moment. They have lost the spirit and sit on their fannies and adore the basilisk who tells them: You are dead or dying. I do not feel surprise over your being overwhelmed by Spengler's genius. The ordinary sources of history and politics which are accessible to your mind, must leave you starved compared to the spicy food offered by Spengler. And this is the first and last thing to be said of him. Your mind is awakening and growing. And for the mind, *genius is the true food*. But, my dear friend, genius is not the last

⁶ Unpublished letter, 31 March, 1919, cited in German in the first footnote of Otto Kroesen & Wim Ravesteijn, "Between Spengler and Rosenstock-Huessy: twofold or threefold thinking within a fourfold reference framework". In Bluhm, G. . (ed.), *The Communicative Construction of Transnational Political Spaces and Times* (Bielefeld, January 2007), 1. www.researchgate.net/publication/270687020_Between_Spengler_and_Rosenstock-Huessy_twofold_or_threefold_thinking_within_a_fourfold_reference_framework.

⁷ See Stünkel, "Fragen und Antworten," 259, n7.17.

criterion. Jesus was a genius who did not care to be one. We must be more than geniuses. Or we will destroy society as the geniuses of old.⁸

It was precisely the “crisis of our social relations” as exemplified in world war that had brought him to demand that grammar be elevated to “the rank of a social science,” a human one that entailed a choice between “History or Science” in section 6 of his 1945 essay on “Grammar as Social Science.” There, he maintains that “all history is the tale of acts in which some speaker and some listener have become one. ‘We’ always has to come about by speech.” The examples Rosenstock-Huessy provides significantly resort to the nuptial and martial imagery of the title of the book where his Spengler review first appeared: *The Wedding of War and Revolution*, pointing to a deeper understanding of revolution as a leap of faith to transmit life and spirit over the chasm of death yawning between generations.

When a man has asked a woman to love him and she has responded, there exists a “we” who can experience together. When soldiers have obeyed their officers, there exists now an army whose campaigns may unfold! But never is there any animal “we.” All “We’s” are historically created by a successful fusion of some speaker and some listeners.¹⁰

For Rosenstock-Huessy, the story of man as the only speaking and therefore political animal is not to be mistaken for a part of natural history (as happens with Spengler). History proper is “the inside story of a We group [...]. But our historians who are not historians, but scientists by intent, pretend that ‘we’ and ‘they’ are words of the same quality.” In their “purely descriptive third person histories, the villain is not in us but in the outside world.”¹¹ This contrast is underlined as *Ein Echo von 1945* before the Envoi of Rosenstock-Huessy’s 1919 text “Der Selbstmord Europas” for the Catholic review *Hochland*, to explain how “*der zweite Weltkrieg nur der Gerichtsvollzieher des ersten gewesen*” (“the second world war was but the bailiff of the first”), repeating American intervention but only shifting by a few degrees westward and to a new generation the same question: decline or suicide?¹² The choice of words at a crossroads set apart two different religions speaking different languages: one of natural process, the other of acts by peoples.¹³ ““The Suicide of Europe” translated the title “The Decline of the West” from the Greek language of genius to the humbler language of those sharing the guilt [*Mitschuldigen*].”¹⁴ For Rosenstock-Huessy, this common involvement in joint responsibility differs radically from the posture of historians and their readers, all pretending to be “seated in some grandstand of the opera as onlookers. Mr. Toynbee and Spengler have popularized this view.”¹⁵ “If anyone asks how to discern the We of genuine history-writing from the ‘they’ stories of the alleged science of history; it is very simple. All scientific history books must foster a plural of histories. Toynbee has 21 civilizations, Spengler has six.”

⁸ Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, *Die Sprache des Menschengeschlechts. Eine leibhaftige Grammatik in vier Teilen. Zweiter Band: Dritter und vierter Teil* (Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1964), 84. The English is from the original letter added to “Der Selbstmord Europas, Gedrückt im ‘Hochland’, April 1919,” which begins on p. 45 in this edition.

⁹ Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, *Die Sprache des Menschengeschlechts. Eine leibhaftige Grammatik in vier Teilen. Erster Band: Erster und zweiter Teil* (Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1961), 436.

¹⁰ Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, *Speech and Reality* (Norwich, VT: Argo Books, 1970), 109.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Rosenstock-Huessy, *Die Sprache des Menschengeschlechts*. Vol. II, 83.

¹³ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Soziologie*, Vol. II: *Die Vollzahl der Zeiten* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1968), 140.

¹⁴ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Die Sprache des Menschengeschlechts*. Vol. II, 83.

¹⁵ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Speech and Reality*, 109.

Particular histories multiply as history becomes more scientific, for “‘they’ can be said of any group and nation, big and small.”¹⁶

But our history would not be our history if it were many. Our history is the story of us who have spoken to each other. We who have our history to tell, first must have been on speaking terms with each other! To have spoken to each other is the indispensable base for our right or capacity of saying “We!”¹⁷

“All ‘we’s’ are historically produced by processes of speaking and listening to each other,” starting from the very pronoun that merges speakers and listeners into a noticeable unity that lasts over time. “Hence the normal sentence with we will be a story”¹⁸ conjugated in the past. The past tense was joined with the “first” person plural on the trajectory “backward” left branch of Rosenstock-Huessy’s grammatical Cross of Reality,¹⁹ to which memory belongs alongside law, history and the epic genre, for “in this form we have a plurality of subjects claiming to have done as one man one and the same act in the past.”²⁰ However, having attached itself to the descriptive/objective “outer,” upper branch at the expense of the other three (lower=inward/I, right=forward/future/you, left=backward/past/we), “the modern mind deliberately declines to distinguish between ‘We’ and ‘they’ statements,” insisting that “speech is part of man’s nature” as an objective property rather than a personal act within a living community. The “academic lie” of history when it equates collective experience and factual description “makes of Thucydides and Tacitus and Macaulay and Gregory of Tours and Voltaire scientists of an objective world despite the fact that every one of them felt himself a faithful child of the history which he tried to rewrite as ‘our history’.”²¹ This conceit is compounded by world-historians as would-be philosophers of history who tend to subsume contingent “we” events under the general laws of an objective “it.” For “the creation of uniqueness, gentlemen, is the task of history,” as Rosenstock-Huessy explained in his “Historiography” class at Dartmouth College, where he taught from 1935 to 1957. “The historian tries to save this uniqueness.” He does not make the World War out of whole cloth, but “accepts, acknowledges, recognizes, and makes recognizable God’s creation inside history,” as an economy of intersubjective events. “The philosopher, however, tries to dissolve this pattern and start from scratch, because he [...] always wants to go to the moment at which history begins,” dismissing as irrelevant to the posthumously discerned arc from cradle to the grave “events that seem unforgettable and unique.”

So Mr. Spengler writes *The Decline of the West*. Mr. Toynbee says, 23 civilizations have passed away. That is, he takes stock of [...] things that have ceased to be. Whereas the historian tries to save what has happened from oblivion so that it can still function. Grave digger, after all, and doctor

¹⁶ Ibid., 110.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ The “prejective” right branch of the Cross of Reality points forward to “you” in the future tense, while the vertical axis is spatial, pointing away (above) at the objective “it/they” direction, and inward (below) at the subjective “I” dimension.

²⁰ Ibid., 109.

²¹ Ibid., 110.

are not quite the same. It is a poor doctor who ends up acting as gravedigger.²²

This in a nutshell is Rosenstock-Huessy's indictment of Spengler: that his "objective" diagnosis of *The Decline of the West* amounts to a prescription for the assisted suicide of Europe, i.e., of the eventful conversation of its many historical layers. The scientific posture of clinical detachment has its roots in the philosopher's stance above the fray, both being epitomized by Spengler's claim to observe the death of his own civilization like that of any other such organism. Alluding to it in a class about (actually against!) "Greek Philosophy," Rosenstock-Huessy said he knew Spengler's words to that effect by heart since the first and only time he read the *Decline* in 1918, modestly adding: "Well, I wrote such a wonderful review about it then that I don't have to reread it, [...]. I know [...] everything that is in it."²³ It is on "Der Selbstmord Europas" that I will first mainly dwell to follow Rosenstock-Huessy's Christian rejoinder to Spengler as the Mephistophelean figure who tempts Faustian man away from Margaret's religion, to fall for the deceptive Helena of natural philosophy as a pagan Greek seduction, related to war (via Troy, to borrow a further metaphor from Goethe's *Second Faust*). Written under the twin impacts of Spengler's work and the Great War, this text constitutes a call to Western man not to allow the owl of Minerva or the dove of Spirit to be confined within the surveyed outlines and crumbling battlements assigned to discrete cultures by world-weary depression under the guise of stoic pride, and to instead release their unpredictable flight into the wider world pried open in space and time by the historical workings of the Cross of Reality, bringing its four directions into conversation in fresh combinations.

III. The Wedding of War and Revolution: Decline of the West, Suicide of Europe, Resurrection of Truth

When Spengler writes the famous line mentioned above: "*Wir kennen unsere Geschichte. Wir werden mit Bewußtsein sterben und alle Stadien der eignen Auflösung mit dem Scharfblick des erfahrenen Arztes verfolgen*" (p. 632²⁴), Rosenstock-Huessy sees this as a repetition of ancient skepticism, in that he wants to grasp the law of history as an outside observer, XXth-century metropolitan intellectual that he is.²⁵ No one is shocked anymore by this stance as Gibbon's contemporaries were by his amoral approach to the *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, even if Spengler's readers are by now involved in their own demise and willing to be buried along with him.²⁶ Anyone mentally alive can sense the monstrous temptation this represents²⁷ after Europeans have gorged on Enlightenment skepticism and modern historiography has completed its tasks. A century and a half later, they are ready to become the objects of a *Decline* of their own, described by Spengler immediately before the Twilight of the Gods of Europe's bankruptcy, between 1911 and 1917, starting in the Belle Époque to be concluded before America's entry into the World War. Rosenstock-Huessy conceived his own "Revolution

²² Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, *Historiography* - 1959 Vol 20 - Lecture 08 - Apr 21, 1959, 40. (Unpublished materials such as lecture transcripts of his courses are available online at <http://www.erhfund.org/the-eugen-rosenstock-huessy-digital-archive/>.)

²³ Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, *Greek Philosophy* - 1956 Vol 16 - Lecture 22-023 - Jan 10, 1957, 23.

²⁴ Rosenstock-Huessy's citations are from the first edition of the first volume of Oswald Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes – Umrisse einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte*. Vol. I: *Gestalt und Wirklichkeit* (Vienna: C.H. Beck, 1918).

²⁵ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Die Hochzeit des Krieges und der Revolution* (Würzburg: Patmos Verlag, 1920), 182.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 162.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 182.

symphony” of European history surveys on February 1, 1917, as an exact contemporary of the Russian Revolution. He would later portray his six years of difference with Spengler’s conception of his *magnum opus* as being more like a 120-year difference.²⁸ “Over these six years, a solitary scholar whose background was in mathematics and philosophy, Oswald Spengler, took it upon himself, with demonic passion, to depict ‘the decline of the West.’” Spengler’s prophetic timetable from 1900 to 2200 actually reflects a scientific calendar still belonging to the XIXth-century world that was swept away in the revolutionary year of the publication of the first volume—such a bestseller that it was out of print within six months. This was due to the novelty of a historian dealing scientifically with the decline of his own world,²⁹ while taking the irreversibility of time seriously, in a way that allowed him to treat events not as mere sequence but as stages in the finite unfolding of a total phenomenon called a great culture with its unique *Gestalt*.³⁰ “Spengler earned his success with a post-war generation thirsting for spirit. But he promises us incarnate form and warm living reality [*leibhaftige Gestalt und blutwarme Wirklichkeit*]. And he promises these as a pure observer, as a skeptic.” Rosenstock-Huessy doubts he can overcome the contradiction this entails for the realm of spirits [*Geisterreich*] he puts before us as a series of watertight compartments.³¹ A stranger to Eros, his Logos

thinks the decline of the West [*Abendland*] at the evening [*Abend*] of life’s day, not in order to salvage the eternal life it holds from the inevitability of temporal death, but to die along with it. But the owl of Minerva does not take flight at dusk to end with the day, but to save through the night the immortal part of the day that has ended. Spengler would deny that the Logos lays on every speaker a responsibility for all those who can be reached by his speaking. He does not speak like the really deep spirits out of a striving for the truth that towers above all times. It is enough for him to be counted among the West’s clever and cultured intellects: we are going to intellectually die, we will be dead within three hundred years.³²

Spengler may not mind this but ought at least to be concerned that his loveless skeptic’s posture robs him of the best fruits of his intuition, namely his morphology of cultures. For within the thousand-year ring he forges around each individual culture, he deliberately downplays the scope of all foreign receptions and Renaissances of former eras. He is so annoyed by the classicism that was the West’s keynote from the XVIth to the XVIIIth centuries that he bans from his book the word “Europe,” which marks the culture’s break from a Christian self-understanding in reaching for a reconstructed Greco-Roman one. Spengler thus dismisses the purely geographical expression “Europe” as absurd (in a long footnote on p. 211³³), and thus misses the central feature of Western Christendom as opposed to the Christian East: the fact that, due to the decline and fall of the Roman Empire as only true of its Western half (since Constantinople endured as New Rome without any “Middle Ages”), it deliberately revives in acts of translation the Roman Empire, Greek culture, and ancient Israel. The West cannot claim to be continuing them without break as “Byzantine” civilization did, not to mention the Islamic world that consciously superseded them. This was philosopher

²⁸ Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, *Ja und Nein. Autobiographische Fragmente* (Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1968), 75.

²⁹ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Die Hochzeit des Krieges und der Revolution*, 162.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 163.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 166.

³² *Ibid.*, 182.

³³ *Ibid.*, 183.

Rémi Brague's argument in his 1992 book *Eccentric Culture: A Theory of Western Civilization* (2009), that covers similar territory to Rosenstock-Huessy, as it also extends in later books to the latter's specialist field of medieval legal history in light of religion. Both thinkers highlight a uniquely Western Christian obsession with understanding all cultures that may exist in the universe, of which Spengler is an ungrateful exemplar, "Greek" that he is in handling it according to Rosenstock-Huessy:

The Greeks cannot give free rebirth to something that is passé. We can. We can squeeze out even the juice out of Eskimos, and [...] primitive people today. We have anthropology today, because we have a respect for these people. We want to find out what kept them going. And this is our era, gentlemen, this freedom of not repeating the performance. You know there are [...] these cyclical obsessions today with us. Mr. Spengler is such a Greek, who has written a book in modern times as though we were all Greeks again; and we had to go inevitably through the same cycles as the Greeks. He has a book, *The Decline of the West*. You have heard of it, haven't you? The same is true of Mr. Toynbee. Toynbee and Spengler, despite Mr. Toynbee's pious exhortations to the opposite, that he is some Christian, he has not an idea what Christianity is, not the slightest idea. The first thing about Christianity is that everything is free, available —if it has been any good —from former civilizations, and that we keep going by freely grafting upon our own tree of life anything we like from others. We have this free selective power.³⁴

What Rosenstock-Huessy is anxious to preserve and bequeath to future generations of all mankind, even beyond the West's predictable decline and fall, is precisely Christianity's "free selective power" among world cultures, that first made them thinkable as a variegated whole. It is ironically on this very power of cognitive and ethical empathy with other cultures that Spengler depends on to deny its possibility. For he adopts a Greek-derived epistemic posture and manages to give uncannily lucid accounts of the Greek or the Egyptian mind, which he can feel his way through to the point of making them come alive for modern Western readers. Rosenstock-Huessy put this self-contradiction to Spengler when he went to see him in Munich around Easter 1919 (April 20), the month his review came out in *Hochland*.

I talked to Mr. Spengler [...]. "How can you know anything about the Greeks? According to your principles, we are all in our own cycle. The Greeks thought this way. We have [...] our own humanities now, you see, so we are doomed to go through our cycle. That's what you say." "Yes," he said. "That's what I say." And I said, "Now then, how do you know that anything you write about the Greeks is true? You only sit in your own little ivory tower as of today [...] and therefore the Greeks are just a sealed book to you, are they not? You say that's a different civilization. How do we understand the Greeks?" He said, "You got me there. That's a secret. It's a paradox. I don't understand it myself. But I am convinced that I understand the Greeks." And I said, "I am, too." But that's why you misjudge your own time, because we are fortunate, you see, in understanding ourselves and another time. The Greeks didn't. And didn't have to. Didn't even try to.³⁵

³⁴ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Greek Philosophy* - 1956 Vol 16 - Lecture 22 - Jan 10, 1957, 22.

³⁵ Ibid.

The Christian era is the first era that has said, "Man does not have to return to his starting point. He can go forward." Every other era —take China's, or take Buddha —is [...] convinced that everything returns, you see. [...] We don't believe in the return of the native. [...] or do we? [...] that's why you are in such great danger, gentlemen. You fall for all these new things, like Spengler, not knowing that you therefore simply relapse into antiquity, into the Greek spirit, into the Greek Academy, which [...] didn't love [...] their enemies. We know — or you should know that America can only survive by loving Russia. That is, by learning from Russia, by accepting all the [...] incentives [...] from Russia. You cannot shut up, you see, and [...] say, "I'm not interested in what's going on there," because God has put the enemy, the devil, as our spur into our flanks.³⁶

This is of course the exact same language Rosenstock-Huessy uses about Spengler's role in his life and thought. It is a very concrete application of the Christian call to love one's enemy, to integrate and not reduce or push away the sign of contradiction he represents to one's self-understanding. Rosenstock-Huessy is forced to constantly hone and refine his own as a Christian, by the pagan Spengler as by the Jew Rosenzweig, just like the latter is as a Jew by the other two. Each is the other's "distemporary" (*Widerwart*), a *beloved enemy* who allows one to find and keep to one's position, made constant by a worthy adversary's vital challenge.³⁷ To shield oneself from it by irenic compromise or total war would be tantamount to decline and death for individuals as for nations and civilizations; they can no longer escape the Christian call to love the enemy as such once it has been issued, turning total strangers into fellow humans whether they like it or not. The same process produces world wars and the notion of crimes against humanity as that which they reveal under existential threat. "We cannot get out of the human family. That's the condition of progress," and the reason Rosenstock-Huessy needs to teach his American students "what is Greek and what is not Greek." Otherwise, they might accept Spengler, Toynbee, Nietzsche, Proust and the like as progressive modern thinkers, taking them at face-value for their cultural novelty.³⁸ But Rosenstock-Huessy holds that "progress is the gift of the Christian era, and it vanishes in proportion as we secede from that era,"³⁹ when we believe like Spengler or Toynbee that history runs in repetitive circles, as many people do in "rebarbarized countries like America and Germany."⁴⁰ There, the philosopher Karl Löwith in Heidelberg can make a living from showing that the Christian account of time is an empty fabrication. If this is taken for granted, Rosenstock-Huessy warns, then Oswald Spengler is quite right to project his own account of time onto individual cultures, ascribing a kiloyear to each. Genius though he is, in denying that they proceed from each other, Spengler has turned these five or six parallel timelines that never meet into as many separate temporal continents, matching those of geography. It doesn't matter if Toynbee counts 23 such civilizations instead. "They all have their own biological time," rising and disappearing in turn, as though they had never been.⁴¹

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 27.

³⁷ Stükel, "Fragen und Antworten," 213ff.

³⁸ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Greek Philosophy* - 1956 Vol 16 - Lecture 22 - Jan 10, 1957, 27.

³⁹ Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, *The Christian Future: Or the Modern Mind Outrun* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), 75ff, 84, cited in George Allen Morgan, *Speech and Society. The Christian Linguistic Social Philosophy of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy* (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1987), 47n7.

⁴⁰ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Greek Philosophy* - 1956 Vol 16 - Lecture 23 - Jan 15, 1957 Lecture, 1.

⁴¹ Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, "Die Gesetze der christlichen Zeitrechnung," Die Münsteraner Vorlesungen. Sommersemester der Theologischen Fakultät der Universität Münster, 1958. 20 two-period sessions. {= Unpublished item, "Die Gesetze der Christlichen Zeitrechnung" (1982).} 228.

Rosenstock-Huessy could then speak of the “Suicide of Europe” about the *Decline of the West*, because for him Western culture only lives as long as it has faith in its own truth. That this faith did not arise from a “maternal landscape” (*mutterliche Landschaft*) but from the “Spirit of the Father of all men” (*Geist des Vaters aller Menschen*) is something that could not be admitted by “a man of genius in the sense of the XIXth century, *ein Geist wie Oswald Spengler*.” He may walk in Goethe’s footsteps, but the poet unconsciously enacted the mediating role of the Logos, whereas it is no surprise that someone whose style is so tuneless as Spengler’s is explicitly reduces language to a shoddy construct conjured up by man as protection from the “real” world; he “must destroy all organs of truth in us, any vital force of the spirit.”⁴² According to Rosenstock-Huessy, lacking both Goethe’s creative impulse and Nietzsche’s lust for life, Spengler appropriates their opinions to turn them into usable know-how for his trade.

The loving Goethe, the drunken Nietzsche would both angrily reject his exclusion of one’s “passion,” of the other’s “will to power.” For without counterweights of daily dying, their vital expressions become presumptions of the customary desk thinker they fought against. Spengler’s own book is actually still written in an ancient, “Euclidian” mode. He formulates, states, ascertains, but on p. 50, author and reader are just as wise as on p. 600!⁴³

This “Goethean” work lacks a quality of vital growth! “Spengler should not be saying: ‘Names are sound and smoke’ [*Name ist Schall und Rauch*], as he constantly does (literally on pp. 196 and 437).”⁴⁴ This entitles him to brush off all names, words, designations encompassing the things of the world across time and millennia as empty wrappers, mere labels stuck to the *Gestalt* of things. He takes it upon himself to show us the mute archetypes [*Urbilder*] of culture, the *Urphänomene* of Being in each millennium, as Faust discerns them among the Mothers. “Spengler wants to show us the NUMINA of things without the NOMINA,” the names we impose on things to shield our weakness from *Weltangst*. (Could they be related to the symbolic order that keeps the threatening nameless “real” of sex and death at bay in Lacan?) Seeing the elemental powers behind the veil of words, Spengler haughtily dismisses names with a wary gesture, unable to recognize in language what embeds culture in the flow of time, pulsing through words as bearers of trusting spirit. He alone is able to move freely beneath them across cultures, having privileged access to the invisible forces that shape them below ground. And he would rather surrender himself and his work to the death of the West, creeping back into the ground of the maternal landscape that parthenogenetically bore it, than allow for his work’s metatemporal [*überzeitliche*] dependence on the Logos.⁴⁵

For Rosenstock-Huessy, Spengler’s book displays a mathematical skepticism that emerges as from deep within the bosom of the age.⁴⁶ Spengler may make even mathematics culturally relative, but he does remain a mathematician. He objectifies the six *Kulturseelen* he has arising from their respective maternal landscapes as virgin births, without a common father. “It is not the human spirit who weds the maternal landscape, but the soul of a culture that arises

(Since published in book form as *Die Gesetze der christlichen Zeitrechnung*. Münsteraner Gastvorlesung an der Theologischen Fakultät der Universität Münster/Westfalen. Rudolf Hermeier & Jochen Lübbers, eds. Münster: Agenda, 2000.)

⁴² Rosenstock-Huessy, *Die Hochzeit des Krieges und der Revolution*, 174.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 181.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 175.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 176.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 177.

from the spirit of the maternal landscape!” There it remains all alone, as but one of six Euclidian geometrical figures of the kind Spengler claims to frown upon, and yet hangs on to as the shards of the time he splinters. “And no bridge leads from one to the other.”⁴⁷ All connecting threads between them are declared to be deceptions. He therefore needs to render harmless the fact that years are still counted from 1 to 1919 as those “of our Lord” by both halves of Christendom, across the geographical and ecclesiastical divide between East and West, and the heterogeneity he would make absolute between “Arabic” Magian culture and the Faustian culture arising at the turn of the first millennium, as though the latter was not an offshoot of the former, on a continuum with it. Spengler constantly insists that similar-sounding names being used over two millennia deceive us, for “under the name and the outer form of magical Christianity on Western European soil, a new religion arises.” (p. 440). Patristic Christianity and the Church of the Crusades are for him “two different religions under the same dogmatic-cultic guise.” (p. 518n1).⁴⁸ This is actually a position that many Orthodox thinkers have seriously entertained, claiming that the common Christianity shared from Ireland to India during the first millennium rapidly turned into something no longer recognizable as such in the Patriarchate of Rome as a second millennium dawned —hence the Great Schism with the four other ancient Patriarchates that stayed the original course in the East. It may be significant that Georges Florovsky, initiator of the neo-Patristic revival that endeavoured to purge the Eastern Church of its “Babylonian captivity” to categories and attitudes imported from Western Christianity and European philosophy, borrowed from Spengler the concept of pseudomorphosis to describe this phenomenon.⁴⁹ That line of thinking can be used to interrogate Rosenstock-Huessy’s eloquent—if rather triumphalist—account of the character and dynamics of second-millennium Western Christendom, from the standpoint of Orthodoxy’s self-understanding as the unreconstructed continuation of the ecumenical first-millennium Church.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, Rosenstock-Huessy seems right to stress how names have a power that survives the original contexts in which they arose and were originally embedded before taking on a life of their own among other cultures as they inherit them, to be transformed by them in turn. If there are neither six (Spengler) nor twenty-three (Toynbee) cultures, there can only be “one history of names on Earth!”⁵¹

So it is with all peoples. The moment they enter the Christian calendar [*Zeitrechnung*], they sacrifice absolute sovereignty over their own name [Christian Roy: e.g., of the kind now being reclaimed in many decolonial gestures] and allow that name to go through all times in which we can all unite, because it is not based on the pride of performance, but on obedience to a time of the Father, in which he has created us all with our great deeds, with our heroic deeds, with our cultures, with our civilisations. Today the struggle is now Spengler, now Toynbee on one side; and whether or not Mr. Toynbee blathers on about Christianity does not matter one bit. He does

⁴⁷ Ibid., 174.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 178.

⁴⁹ Ryan Hanning, “Development, Change and Pseudo-morphosis in the writing of Fr. Georges Florovsky and its application to the study of Peter Mohyla” (2014), www.academia.edu/3768967/Stages_of_Pseudo-Morphosis_in_the_Writings_of_Georges_Florovsky?auto=download (accessed April 8, 2019).

⁵⁰ See Christian Roy, “Europe as the Culture of Revolutions according to Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy: Probing a Western Christian Pattern with the Christian East in Mind,” in *European Culture 2015, 13th edition, 29-31 October 2015, Cluj-Napoca, Conference Proceedings*, ed. Nicolae Păun & Enrique Banús . (Cluj-Napoca: Presa Universitară Clujeană - Editura Fundației pentru Studii Europene, 2016), 277-284.

⁵¹ Rosenstock-Huessy, “Die Gesetze der christlichen Zeitrechnung,” 87.

not believe in it, since he does not posit one history that has Christ at its center.⁵²

Rosenstock-Huessy's harsh dismissiveness of Toynbee may perhaps give pause to Spenglerians who offer a spirited defence of ideologized remnants of cultural Christianity as European identity-markers, in a last-ditch attempt to prop up Western civilization for its Caesarian stage of forced coherence, gesturing to largely hollowed-out heritage to stave off final collapse until the appointed end a couple of centuries hence.⁵³ This leaves little room—Rosenstock-Huessy would be quick to point out—for the revolutionary genius of Christianity to play out even anonymously, as leaven in dead-end situations it may recharge with symbolic meaning and unexpected breakthroughs, potentially as inconspicuous and far-reaching as its first appearance on the edge of the Roman Empire. Because Toynbee wants to have it both ways in treating Christianity as both a universal faith and but one among 23 high cultures, he is held in especial contempt by Rosenstock-Huessy, in a way that Spengler is not. “I mean, he’s much more stupid than Spengler. Spengler was a genius, a pagan who wanted to be a pagan. He had the pride of his convictions. Mr. Toynbee always goes down on his knees and says, [...] I pray on Sundays. Only on weekdays [...] am I a pagan.”⁵⁴ Still, “Spengler allows many insights to escape him even in particulars, because as a heathen, as a despiser of the Word, he can only refer to the change from quality into quantity, from orthodoxy into heresy, with the nameless-numinous, arch-idealistic [*echt-idealistischen*] slogans *Kultur* and *Zivilisation*.” To remain free of religious dogma such as would illuminate the West’s destiny and decline, Spengler has cobbled together for himself a dogma of Mother Earth, which always comes up short when the very disclosure of the Earth as one globe becomes a presupposition instead of the result of a particular history: that of the Christian West. This may be a marked progress from “presuppositionless” idealism, but Spengler comes no closer to his goal with his private dogma of Gaia as the Creatrix of Heaven and Earth.⁵⁵

Ignoring both Church and Synagogue, the Christian Era of historical time and the Eternal Jew, Spengler’s book feels as withered as the West whose decline it traces. “For if Jewry and Church represent the two immortal figures of world-history,” they alone can provide the universal calendars (*Zeitrechnungen*) needed to bring out the outlines of a morphology of world-history. Counted from the appearance in historical time of eternal life, the Christian era opens to human consciousness the infinite time-space in which Spengler can try to fit his six culture boxes. Rosenstock-Huessy sees in this boundless horizon the common source of both the golden background of the “Magian” East’s eternal heights and Rembrandt’s brown, indefinite “Faustian” distance. If the Christian Era begins when eating from the Tree of Life becomes possible again, the Jewish calendar starts with Creation, and time as we know it with the eating of the fruit of the knowledge of good and evil. “But this is the day when death was created, i.e., precisely the entrance door to Spengler’s favourite concept of ‘higher humanity,’ which arises from the experience of death.” If we are to believe Rosenstock-Huessy, it is no coincidence that in the Jewish calendar time since Creation adds up in a sequence the six millennia that Spengler grants to the six cultures making up “higher humanity.” Because Spengler puts the ancient Euclidian corporeality of six individual cultures in the place of the eternal-immeasurable rebirth of historical life revealed in Christ, and the nameless NUMEN of “higher humanity” in the place of man’s creation and fall, he becomes the blind

⁵² Ibid., 281.

⁵³ See for instance David Engels, “Onze culturele neergang is onvermijdelijk,” *Weekblad ‘t Pallieterke* (September 16, 2020), <https://palnws.be/2020/09/onze-culturele-neergang-is-onvermijdelijk/>.

⁵⁴ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Greek Philosophy* - 1956 Vol 16 - Lecture 22 - Jan 10, 1957, 21.

⁵⁵ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Die Hochzeit des Krieges und der Revolution*, 188.

unconscious slave of both revelations, of the Old as of the New Testament—as timeless frames within which the limiting experience of death can appear in blocks of finite time. As though playing hide-and-seek, Spengler cannot look either the Christian or the Jewish calendar in the face in a work that claims to have discovered the true account of time. Rosenstock-Huessy can thus portray Spengler as the type [*Figur*] of the spirit who defies the Word first-born as Jesus Christ, wanting no part of eternal life but preferring to die along with his *Heimatseele*.⁵⁶ He finds it a ghastly self-contradiction that a soul would offer up all its secret forces just to die (at best in a Caesarian last stand of its bodily frame as *rigor mortis* sets in). Soul and immortality for Rosenstock-Huessy are just names for the same event, i.e., our earthly existence (beyond which he dismisses post-mortem life in a transcendental realm as a Platonic conceptualization of a this-worldly resonance of historical figures across time, which is immortality enough for him). “A soul that consciously sacrifices its immortality is committing suicide [*Selbstmord*],” he insists, adding that with Spengler’s book, the soul of the West is already “murdered [*ermordet*].”⁵⁷

Spengler’s morbid mood, Rosenstock-Huessy concedes, is at least honest, sobering, even salutary, compared to other wartime scholarship, that makes him despair of “living faith in the language of knowledge.” “All disciplines have lost the strength to distinguish in their objects what is spoiled and what is fresh, dead or alive, good or bad, valuable or worthless.” Everything is investigated with the same indifference, as “chance, fragment, material at which it winks a ‘maybe.’” Spengler’s book was fittingly conceived before the war, when it could still seem “such a partial attempt at restoring European science” might succeed. By war’s end, the chasm separating science from truth had grown so wide that the renewal of a sickened spirit could not come from Western book learning, even as popularized as Spengler’s was.⁵⁸ It was now a matter of earning credibility in a struggle for faith, love, and hope, as more than institutions or ideals: “eternal heavenly powers that are called to rule over both, but which for a hundred years have been catalogued as ‘religion’ in an ever-narrower corner of European culture.” Rosenstock-Huessy did not care to hang on to that label of religion, calling instead on the invisible to reorient hearts around the wind rose of human strivings (his *Cross of Reality*) as opposed to the weathervane of the human mind. It would in no way affect Christian truth to have to await the year 2200 of the West’s predicted final demise to rise again. The soul lives in the pure present (*reine Gegenwart*) and if it leaves behind the past millennium, it is also not bound by Spengler’s astrological foreordaining of becoming by being. “The future as sketched by Spengler’s science is only the ghost of the past, projected into the future,”⁵⁹ whereas for Rosenstock-Huessy, history is prophecy projected into the past.

Still, amidst Germany’s post-war revolutions and instability, with hopes and fears teetering wildly between extremes, pinned on happy or unhappy accidents in turn, “the majesty of Spengler’s law of death is a lofty and liberating deed. It shows what it costs to create, to maintain and to destroy a world. He is therefore a thousand times right against the unbelieving ‘Maybe, but maybe not’ of the generation of *Quantitätspolitiker* in all areas of life. But the existence of a freedom that here and now is able to throw overboard all historical laws through this hour’s death and resurrection is hidden to him as to all the rich in spirit [*Geistreichen*]. It is not in favour of that blind approximation of chaotic knowledge before the law, but of freedom according to the law that I contradict Spengler,” Rosenstock-Huessy writes, even

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 189-190.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 191.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 195.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 199.

while in complete agreement about contemporary scholarship.⁶⁰ He points out that Spengler himself is aware of how a world that only knows the will to power, having lost the capacity to discriminate between good and evil, is itself doomed to die. That is even how he could write of *The Decline of the West* that it was the other side of the same coin as the haughty Nietzschean stance beyond good and evil. “God and God’s will are identical today, says the aristocrat Spengler in so many words.” But the dove of Spirit counters both mass complacency and individual force with the outrageous proclamation that God is truth and will be what He will be (the Hebrew meaning of YHWH), regardless of earthly social good and evil or heroic-Dionysian strength and weakness.⁶¹ It is not even in our power to make an end of things: death serves life, and suicide should not be taken as an end. This is why, Rosenstock-Huessy concludes, Spengler should have given the decline of the West another name, that rings from beyond the graves: “the resurrection of truth.”⁶²

This was the aim that Rosenstock-Huessy had resolved to work toward shortly before coming across Spengler’s book. His review of it thus provides a programmatic foretaste of his answer to it. For he also wrote: “Historians do examine the phenomena of European revolutions. None of them suspect the actual calling of each particular revolution, ‘the curse of the bad deed’ [*den Fluch der bösen Tat*], for the general budget [*Gesamthaushalt*] of history.”⁶³ Rosenstock-Huessy was then pointing to his own calling, revealed in a flash in 1917 as Spengler was completing his *Decline*: to be the historian who would connect the dots between European revolutions within the divine plan, as he would boldly spell it out in an essay on John Calvin, along with the precondition of Jesus Christ as the Lord of History whose “name is above all names.” (Philippians 2:9) “Your name, my dear dispirited friends, does not stand naked and mute before the judge. You appear before him under the mighty name of our first-born brother and king. My own life’s work has collected around a corresponding task, so that the Toynebes, the Van Loons, the Spenglers and the Gibbons may be overcome by a true economy of salvation [*Haushalt des Heils*, lit. “housekeeping of salvation”], a ‘fullness of time’ [in the plural as *Vollzahl der Zeiten*].”⁶⁴

Rosenstock-Huessy wanted to pull together into a theologically inflected narrative account that full accounting of space and time that Faustian man opened a thousand years ago. It may be argued that this “holy” book of accounts is opened and political economy truly starts with the Great Survey ordered by William the Conqueror in 1086 (unparalleled in Britain until 1873) that became known as the Domesday Book —“the Book of Judgement,” “because its decisions, like those of the Last Judgement, are [as] unalterable...as the sentence of that strict and terrible last account”⁶⁵; thus, death and taxes are still paired to sum up the inevitable in English parlance. Be that as it may, for Rosenstock-Huessy, the XIIIth-century *Dies irae* (“Day of Wrath”) hymn that secular culture has inherited as a signifier of death revealed the unmistakable time signature beating the measure of European revolutions. In *Die Hochzeit des Krieges und der Revolution*, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy gave credit to Spengler for rightly pointing out the beginnings of Faustian culture in a new experience not just of death, but of time as counted—and he would add, of every point in space, member of society, and personal power

⁶⁰ Ibid., 200.

⁶¹ Ibid., 201.

⁶² Ibid., 203.

⁶³ Ibid. 192.

⁶⁴ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Die Sprache des Menschengeschlechts*, Vol. II, 298.

⁶⁵ King Henry II’s treasurer and bishop of London Richard FitzNeal ca. 1179, cited in Christian Roy, “Space, Time, and the Christian Matrix of Faustian Man,” in *100 Years after the Publication of The Decline of the West: Oswald Spengler in an Age of Globalisation*, ed. David Engels (Waltrop: Edition Sonderwege, 2021), 177.

as counting in the final reckoning where world economy and salvation history converge. Building on Spengler's insight about the starting point of this countdown to the planetary unfolding of a distinctly Faustian horizon, Rosenstock-Huessy would differ about its meaning and workings, presenting them as that of a uniquely Western Christian eschatology through European revolutions in the calendar and nations as carriers of a universal mandate that remains a constant from its religious origin to its material translations. All are efforts to change the world rather than just think it, to paraphrase Marx. Rosenstock-Huessy's quarrel with Spengler was that he was too philosophically "detached" to set the second millennium, that of Faustian culture, within the Christian (and for the first time Common) Era of the eternal's inscription in self-conscious history with a beginning (Creation), middle (Incarnation) and end (eschaton). Spengler's treatment of it as no different from the second millennium B.C. was both a daring move and a serious shortcoming, especially when it came to the stakes of contemporary history. It amounted to severing "scientific" history from living memory (a criticism along the lines of Nietzsche's about "The Use and Abuse of History for Life"⁶⁶), which for Faustian man was willy-nilly a specific Christian one. Rosenstock-Huessy's own approach to history was an autobiographical one about the "we" that made him and his contemporaries who they were, through memories that articulated and contrapuntally deployed a defining calling through time and space. He applied it most intensively in his account of Christianity's second millennium as that of a sequence of interlocking European revolutions leading up to the third-millennium ecumene. There, his differences with Spengler about its interpretation come to the fore in statements I will piece together mostly from his masterwork.

IV. The Sequence of Revolutions as the Autobiography of Western Man in the Second Millennium

The ringing hours and the belfries that show us the time go together with the West's Faustian sense of time. And they really arose around the year 1000. With amazing astuteness, Spengler catches the turning point where the sense of historical perspective breaks through, in the definition [*Abgrenzung*] of the seven sacraments around 1100. [...] To clarify the true heart of the matter, it can be said that the seven sacraments do represent a biographical septenary. Through them every Western soul at the same time gets its own biography; every Westerner undergoes a development of the soul from sacrament to sacrament. Life thus acquires perspective!⁶⁷

That biographical perspective becomes the historical one in which the story of its genesis and development can be rewritten in exile as *Out of Revolution. Autobiography of Western Man* (1938). And since, from an eschatological standpoint, "history is prophecy turned backwards,"⁶⁸ the tale can now even be told from the last to the first of the six or seven defining revolutions of Christianity's second millennium, partly to allow an American audience to connect to the familiar modern ones before being led along the red thread connecting them in reverse sequence to their prototypes in the ignored and deprecated "dark ages" of faith. The entry (one of many) Rosenstock-Huessy wrote for *The American People's Encyclopedia* on "Revolution" succinctly sets up his own account of this topic over against

⁶⁶ See Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, "The Predicament of History," *Journal of Philosophy* 32/4 (1935): 93–100.

⁶⁷ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Die Hochzeit des Krieges und der Revolution*, 172.

⁶⁸ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Die Sprache des Menschengeschlechts*, Vol. II, 355.

competing ones, be it *The Anatomy of Revolution* (in England, America, France and Russia) that Crane Brinton put out in a more evolutionary perspective the same year as *Out of Revolution*, or the ancient cyclical view of time and history he portrayed there as modified in the second millennium by a shifting coexistence of its rotating phases that enables meaningful incremental growth over successive revolutions.

Polybius, for example, described the regular “rotation” of governments from monarchy through aristocracy, democracy and tyranny back to monarchy, with each form degenerating and thus giving way to the next in a regular and inevitable progression. These revolutions were the analogues to the “revolutions” of the heavens, or the orderly movement of the constellations. In the twentieth century, Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee, in different ways, preserved something of this conception in their descriptions of the life cycles of civilizations. Spengler stressed the inevitability of collapse. Toynbee, while denying the inevitability of collapse, pointed out that of 20 or more civilizations studied by him, all but one (Western civilization at the moment) had in fact collapsed.⁶⁹

“Rosenstock’s works, on the other hand, stress the role of ‘total revolutions’” (distinguished from “half revolutions” such as those of the Americas),⁷⁰ beginning when

... popes and monastic orders succeeded in establishing among other things, (1) the principle that the secular state should not be the complete and absolute authority over the people; and (2) the principle, embodied in twelfth century Canon Law and in such later documents as the Declaration of Independence, that people have the duty to revolt against a tyranny that refuses to reform itself. The total revolutions that ensued first in Germany and then in England, France, and Russia, represented “renewals” of history. That is, each was an attempt to return to the “first principles” of social order. Each sought to recreate mankind and to start history anew. In each total revolution certain qualities and potentialities of man, previously acknowledged insufficiently or not at all by the powers-that-were, were stressed by the revolutionists to a degree so extreme that the rest of the Western world felt threatened. [...] Ultimately, however, each revolution did effect a transformation of the world in that other countries, having succeeded in largely confining the revolution to the country of origin and no longer fearful of being overrun, gradually came to accept the reality and the essential legitimacy of the issues that had given rise to the revolution and the relative permanence of the new order in the country in which the revolution had begun, and gradually adapted to their own systems some of the principles and values of the revolution. Thus, did the total revolutions complement each other, creating a “family of nations” in Europe.⁷¹

Europe’s revolutions are alternating prismatic reflections of a foundational reorientation within Western Christendom that happens to corroborate Spengler’s insight in timing and nature: one towards the Last Judgment as no “mere religious concept without practical

⁶⁹ Eugen Rosenstock-Huussy and Francis Squibb (unsigned), “Revolution,” *The American People’s Encyclopedia*, Vol. 16 (Boston: Grolier, 1962), 467-468.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

consequences,” but in fact “a political agency of the first importance.” “Oswald Spengler says in one of his deepest remarks that every civilization sets out with a new experience of death,” and the Faustian one did arise in Europe in 998 “when All Souls was added to All Saints” as an extra November 2 day of all the dead,⁷² due to the same continent-wide movement centered in the abbey of Cluny that gave all men an individualized, negotiable post-mortem destiny with the invention of Purgatory.

For it gave comfort to innumerable people in the loneliness of their hearts to celebrate the truth that death was universal and that all men would be rallied at the Last Judgment. And they would actually spend two thirds of their fortune to arm themselves against this last day. ...

And this confederacy was also democratic. In Dante’s poem, there are popes in hell and emperors in purgatory. ... Dante’s *Divine Comedy* is divine because it reveals how men can be equal in the eyes of the Creator.⁷³

On the Last Day, that is. For in the meantime, “the curialists clearly had the idea that pope and Holy Church could pass judgment on all and every thing, as *vicars of Christ*. They actually no longer waited for the Last Judgment.”⁷⁴ This eschatological rush to judgment within history (rather than any ethnic baggage or geographic background as Spengler would have it) is what gave the Christian West its distinctive revolutionary momentum and Faustian soul. Putting this critical power of life and death in human (if specially ordained) hands, “the practical gain from the pope’s vicarate was stupendous. A new time span was wrested from death and decay. Mankind no longer had to fear an immediate inbreak of the Last Judgment. The formula of the ‘rapidly approaching end of time,’ so common in the documents between 800 and 1100, now disappears,”⁷⁵ replaced by a newfound confidence to build and develop far and wide in all areas. Under the Pope’s claim of direct universal jurisdiction (the decisive innovation that took Rome out of communion with the four other ancient patriarchates of the still “Magian” Christian East), “Rome and Jerusalem, *urbs* and *orbis*, the City of Rome and the circumference of the globe, were united by permeating all places with one supernatural vision. Spengler has called Greek antiquity Euclidian, local, atomistic, without the Faustian character of perspective and background, fusion and shadows. Gregory [VII, Pope (1073-1085)] is the man who discovered the fusion of omnipresence and centralization, the anti-classical and anti-pagan concept of the Middle Ages.”⁷⁶ Likewise, “the Roman Church keeps a vigilant watch” against the new threat of the coming of the Anti-Christ (under the guise of any designated opposition party), which did not quite have “the paralyzing quality of the Last Judgment” it was expected to immediately precede. “For, it was a problem, not of the Beyond, but of this lower world. The doctrines of authority on one side and of Anti-Christ on the other brought men back to a definite interest in the history of the world,” acted upon from the Crusades to the great discoveries of geography and science. As Dostoevsky could still hint with horror as an Eastern Christian in his parable of the Grand Inquisitor, “actually the Papal

⁷² It is probably no coincidence that “Kriegsteilnehmer aller Länder, vereinigt euch!” (“Combatants of all countries, unite!”), the last of Rosenstock-Huessy’s 1915 “St. George Lectures” from the Western Front, already based on his Cross of Reality, was dated to commemorate the first of his European revolutions: “2. November, Allerseelen.” The unedited text opens *Die Sprache des Menschengeschlechts*, Vol. II, 15-19. See *Ja und Nein*, 74.

⁷³ Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, *Out of Revolution: Autobiography of Western Man* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1938), 508.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 557.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 555.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 536

Authority was committed to a postponement of salvation. The more efficiently it delayed the coming of the Antichrist, the more powerful it became, and the less real seemed the end of time.”⁷⁷ The Reformation would bring back the fear of the Lord to the people of God by turning the tables on the Roman Church and exposing her as the long-feared Anti-Christ who had already usurped for worldly power the authority of the Last Judgment. If, “looking backward from the final goal of all mankind, the pope perceived the truth about this world” on which he stood in judgment as Christ’s vicar, “in Lutheranism the lost horizon was replaced by the limitless concept of the kingdom of God. Yet soon, the new party of the Puritans felt that the Lutherans did nothing to bring about this kingdom of heaven” on earth.⁷⁸

Cromwell accepted the kingdom of God as being either here or nowhere. He hated men who passively faced the unattainable in the Lutheran way. Up to the present day, Anglo-Saxon Christians sigh at the rigid inactivity of the Lutherans and their disbelief that we can realize the kingdom of heaven on earth. All German philosophy is but an attempt to remove the kingdom of heaven to a transcendental space and time which is inaccessible for mortals but which nevertheless stimulates us constantly to make a new (though hopeless) effort in the direction of the ideal.⁷⁹

By contrast, Anglo-Protestants as the chosen people can see no end to their world-historical kingdom, except for the danger of “pride, Lucifer’s sin. This would mean the renewed loss of paradise regained,” the fearful yet fascinating temptation dramatized by Milton. It is as though he anticipated how his fellow millenarians, the originally English, often Biblical literalist scientists who started deciphering the book of Nature to find the rational mind of God in the mechanical laws governing Creation,⁸⁰ unwittingly allowed arrogant pride “into the earthly paradise of man’s genius and self-made arts and sciences,” so that “mankind plunged intentionally” into this secular revolution after 1789.⁸¹

Lucifer lost his diabolical character. He was hailed as Prometheus. To this Promethean civilization of the nineteenth century the old curses no longer sounded terrible. The only future that seemed dreadful was physical decay and disintegration. The downfall of all higher values, the desertion from the beautiful, the good and the true to the primitive standards of violence, vitality and regularity was forecast and deplored by all the prophets of the liberal century. The Soviets by abolishing truth, the Nazis by abolishing justice, openly broke away from the liberal tradition of the French Revolution.⁸²

By so much it becomes clear that Oswald Spengler or Georges Clemenceau were not the first to fear the end. Every form of civilization has its own vision of the end of things. The dictatorship of the proletariat, the so-called

⁷⁷ Ibid., 555.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 557. The contrast Rosenstock-Huessy explains here is confirmed by Kenneth C. Barnes, *Nazism, Liberalism, and Christianity: Protestant Social Thought in Germany and Great Britain, 1925-1937* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1991).

⁷⁹ Ibid., 556

⁸⁰ See David F. Noble. *The Religion of Technology. The Divinity of Man and the Spirit of Invention*. New York: Knopf, 1997. Chapters 4 and 5.

⁸¹ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Out of Revolution*, 557.

⁸² Ibid., 557-8.

revolution in permanence, is limited, even threatened, by the possibility of a state-less and class-less society.

... To Lenin, the downfall of civilization was not a threat, as it was to Clemenceau: it was a fact upon which to build.⁸³

And so it is to Rosenstock-Huussy, a conservative in temper with a deep appreciation of the layers of historical evolution embedded in civilization and of the pain involved in the revolutions that strip them off. He stands with “the heroes who destroy and create these horizons”⁸⁴ at the right times rather than with someone like Charles Lindbergh who, in his 1936 Berlin speech, praised the accelerationist anti-Communist regimes of the aeronautical age for “trying to anticipate ‘Classless Society.’ If successful, they would annihilate the historical horizon of Marxism. But they are merely counter-revolutionary; for they are not overawed by the end of time.”⁸⁵ By contrast, Rosenstock-Huussy thinks of himself as a “counter-reactionary,” ever vigilant against sterile stasis and regression that result from blindly keeping change at bay, instead of hearkening to the signs of the times. It is as a Christian that he can take any revolution in stride, having shown how “Christian civilization has always faced more than the death of the individual; it anticipates the death of its most sacred ideals and institutions. In contradiction to nature, civilization is not interested in the survival of the fittest. It is interested in something more modest and more important, something too simple to be mentioned by philosophers. It is interested in survival after death. Individuals die anyway. Man is mortal,”⁸⁶ except for the quasi-immortal, ever provisional “shell of civilization” he grows but must periodically shed to build a new shelter against death.

After the renovation by emperors and monks, the Church itself had to learn to bury its old shell. Kings, aristocrats, bourgeois, and labourers learned to distrust the immortality of their respective civilization in a process of eternal vigilance. In anticipating the Anti-Christ the mediaeval Church watched for the slightest symptom of decay. By anticipating the final threat, any form of society can attain immortality. By anticipation of the hour of death, the life cycle can be governed consciously.⁸⁷

This is an implicit response to Spengler’s famous statement that Rosenstock-Huussy often explicitly brings up as the attitude he rejects, about how “we shall die consciously. And we shall observe every step which leads to our death with deliberation.” Not to deny that “he was a genius.” But it was a measure of that genius that, when “he saw in Hitler the year 2300 being present in 1934,” he realized it meant “the end of his own time, of his own world. And he died.”⁸⁸ This commands Rosenstock-Huussy’s great respect for a man so woven into the fate of his civilization that “he can even correct his projection, and because he [...] was still a little off, you see, suddenly seeing himself confronted with this monster from the abyss, he falls into the abyss himself and says, ‘It’s all over. [...] the world I have, so to speak, identified myself with.’”⁸⁹ Likewise, wistfully looking back on the medieval age of faith, “the American

⁸³ Ibid., 555-6.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 560.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 558. In a nutshell, “Gain and Loss of Historical Horizons: Last Judgment anticipated 1080; Anti-Christ anticipated 1517; Kingdom of Heaven anticipated 1649; Earthly Paradise (Adam) anticipated 1789; Decadence, Disintegration anticipated 1917; Downfall of Liberty, New Barbarian Classless Society anticipated 1933.”

⁸⁶ Ibid., 560.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 561.

⁸⁸ Rosenstock-Huussy, *Greek Philosophy* - 1956 Vol 16 - Lecture 22 - Jan 10, 1957 Lecture, 23.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 24.

historian Henry Adams had prophesied that 1917 would be the year in which the acceleration of Technique would outrun our capacity for experience. [...] I am convinced that he died that year just like Oswald Spengler, not by chance, but the very year in which his prophecy became true, i.e. in 1936 when he died of Hitler. Both men, Adams and Spengler, have sealed their insights. [...] It is part of this book's belief that everyone has the time in which he believes himself. Henry Adams and Spengler are to be taken seriously. Technique has become faster than its peddlers and manipulators. The West has gone under." Neither historian had any idea he would be struck down by the lightning of his most frightening insight, shooting right through the useless protective screen of the particular conceptual apparatus he had erected⁹⁰—of no more lasting value than the empty shells of dead or dying civilizations it was designed to collect and dissect.

Scientific interpretations of history, like the Marxian or the Hegelian scheme or Henry Adams' law of acceleration, are little more than his gadgets and tools for building another scaffold around the old house of mankind's memories for his work of repair. The historians of the last century particularly sinned: they took their scaffold for an end in itself. Hegel and Marx, Carlyle and Spengler, over-cultivated the historian's pride. The machinery of their individual scaffolds appealed to them too much.⁹¹

But rather than construct "laws and generalities," "as a physician must act, regardless of medical theories, because his patient is ill, so the historian must act under a moral pressure to restore a nation's memory or that of mankind. Buried instincts, repressed fears, painful scars, come for treatment to the historian," who "regenerates the great moments of history and disentangles them from the mist of particularity." "One thing seems to be especially responsible for the emancipation of history from its service to real memory." Due to the social dislocation and attendant loss of living oral memory accompanying the Industrial Revolution as the Church weakened, "traditions were entering into dissolution and anarchy during the nineteenth century. History and written literature became substitutes for all others forms of tradition," as an "emergency measure."⁹² But when it caters to "millions of readers who have not learned to digest a real historical experience," "the best-intended history plays the role of a dangerous soporific. It once more weakens the creative power of the reader to experience history for himself."

Thus, the historian is as often the grave-digger of our memories as their restorer. His work tests the duration of living memory, strengthens the rising, and buries the withered. Liberal society was vigorous enough in 1815 to build up a new historical faith; Spengler obliterated the same society's tradition after 1918.

Spengler's success in the context of "the blight which the World War laid upon national traditions" had made "people quite willing to surrender their own traditions and memories! At the end of a period, traditions are so shaky that the stylus of Clio gives way to the brush and the obliterating sponge." "Oswald Spengler is the clearest type of a writer of 'history without memory.' In his *Decline of the West* he gives a world history without mentioning one word or expression used by the contemporaries of his events."⁹³ But as Rosenstock-Huussy points out, "historians in all times have made the people themselves speak again" —a vital consideration for the originator of *Sprachdenken*, who feels uneasy that "the good historian of

⁹⁰ Rosenstock-Huussy, *Die Europäischen Revolutionen und der Charakter der Nationen* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1951), 518-19.

⁹¹ Rosenstock-Huussy, *Out of Revolution*, 696.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid., 698.

a limited period could and can escape Spenglerianism much more easily than I who have had to deal with the Great Series of Revolutions”⁹⁴ as the cross-temporal conversation of men’s efforts to transmit to the future what mattered to them, rather than look at their world as though it was not woven of memories. Because it was written “for those who despair of ever acquiring a memory and a tradition, to the children who wish never to become adults,”

Spengler’s book outdistanced all European and occidental traditions by subordinating them to a scheme that was suitable for the struggles of the second or third millennium B.C. It dumped the burden of our own forefathers’ history into an abyss where it lay together with the rubbish of five or six other ‘civilizations.’ Spengler enabled post-war society, especially in Germany, to bury its own traditions, since it now had as little contact with the names and dates of its own past as with the external facts of any Saharan civilization.⁹⁵

We may note here how Rosenstock-Huessy tends to array different accounts of time as though they jostled to get ahead in its march to the endpoint or goal from which meaning is retrospectively conferred upon its historical course as a kind of race —whether he is talking about Adams’ Technique-driven acceleration, Lindbergh’s air raid of reactionary modernist progress against Communism, Spengler’s cyclical decline into Caesarism, or *The Christian Future: Or the Modern Mind Outrun* (1966) in his own book about the anonymous consummation of the Christian era in the economic ecumene of its third millennium, ushered in by a thirty-year world war as the revolutionary birth pangs of a fledgling planetary order. Conversely, in their desperate, destructive last stand against this culmination of the Judaeo-Christin dispensation, “the Nazis plan to return into the forests like the Germanic tribes”, Rosenstock-Huessy maintains shortly after Spengler’s demise at the prospect.

The Jews, who represent the universal history of mankind, stand in their way. Yet it is perhaps only through the Jews that the world may become a playground for tribal primitivism! Possibly the Jews will contribute more than others to that universal organization of production which makes wars impossible and leads in a world-wide economy. This is the necessary presupposition for the revival of primitive archetypes in different sectors of the globe. Since this revival is interested in buried instincts, it can be neither Christian nor philosophical, in the sense in which the English, American or French Revolutions were philosophical or the Roman, Italian, and German were Christian.⁹⁶

Following the first millennium’s drive to retrieve Israel and the second millennium’s wager to revive Rome and Greece, the third, post-Christian millennium will be irrationally neo-tribal as a kind of spontaneous counterweight to methodical economic globalism, pitting special identities against universalist ideologies, as Rosenstock-Huessy foresaw with startling accuracy in the interwar period already, as though paraphrasing McLuhan about new media’s effects three decades ahead.

The early stages of human development will be the goal of efforts which will no longer pretend to be deliberate or logical revolutions. They will be “Relapses” into instinctive phases of primitive life and “Reproductions” of

⁹⁴ Ibid., 706.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 698.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 718.

archetypes. [...] A relapse toward the dawn of civilization is opposed to any world-wide generalization. It will become the pride of such a relapse to be anti-universal and limited to a single local or social group. Economy will be universal, mythology regional. Every step in the direction of the world economy will be bought off by a great number of tribal reactions. The clans of the future cannot follow the same technique which we described through the two cycles of clerical and secular revolutions. Even so, it remains probable that the tribes of the future will pass through the forms of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy like Church and State in the past.⁹⁷

Though Rosenstock-Huessy thus provides for a certain secondary validity of the ancient Polybian theory of revolutions, he hastens to add that “if this future cycle of political forms occurs—breaking up the dictatorships of our present stage of transition—it will have nothing to do with the course of the season through the year, as Spengler thought. Civilization is not a counterpart of the seasons, spring, summer, autumn and winter in perpetual recurrence. For man answers the threats of nature by heroic efforts which counterbalance her eccentricities,” valuing old age at an early “primitive” stage and glorifying youth as he falls into dotage, like modern civilization.⁹⁸ Ever crucial to Rosenstock-Huessy, “the whole question of progress depends on the possibility of coexistence of all the rungs of the ladder. In the woods, if you completely forget your starting point, you are likely to walk in a circle.” Only critical memory of the kind made possible by Christian culture, able to creatively retrieve past ages and not just react predictably to recent developments, can prevent the arrow of time from devolving into a snake that feeds on its own tail, ouroboros-like.

To be driven in a vicious circle is the bogey and, in most cases, the real fate of pagan or primitive man. Their whole civilization is an endless repetition, without any opening or broadening out. Mr. Spengler, with his astounding primitivism, basks in this recurrence of spring, summer, autumn, and winter in each period of civilization. Primitive social groups, because they do not manage to coexist with their enemies, except by eating them, are bound to rotate in a vicious circle. The meaninglessness of so many South American revolutions, even as seen by the most sympathetic observers, such as Joseph Conrad in his *Nostromo*, is based on the fact that they follow each other in hopeless repetition. These revolutions are revolting to our human sensibilities because humanity yearns for growth and fulfilment. The great revolutions we have treated must be carefully distinguished from this mechanism of the vicious circle. They are great because they are sown in one common field of man’s experience and hope. They all try to embrace all mankind; one after the other and one beside the other; like separate branches they are all grafted on the common tree of humanity.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 465. This passage is also included word for word in the essay “Polybius, or The Reproduction of Government” of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy’s intellectual self-presentation *I am an Impure Thinker* (Norwich, VT: Argo Books, 1970), 149.

V. Gaia vs. the One God: A Westernized World Gives Way to the Third Millennium's Planetary Man

For Rosenstock-Huessy, this tree that conjoins “sequence in time and togetherness in space”¹⁰⁰ comes into view in Christ as the Cross of Reality, in all its changing permutations.¹⁰¹ It is rooted in the Jewish experience of “wrestling with God” (the meaning of “*Israel*”) as a people chosen to fulfill the Eternal’s plan for Creation, a particular community tasked with working out a responsibility for all mankind, as every European national revolution does in turn. Thus, any attempt to sidestep or sideline that active sense of mankind as inescapably bound up in a common destiny that leaves out no part of it will naturally begin by undermining, minimizing, when not scapegoating the unique place of the Jewish people and Biblical Revelation generally, since it is the catalyst of world-history’s self-awareness as a single process. Alternative accounts may try to instead fill that new narrative space with a rationalization of older patterns derived from pagan worldviews, like most of the Conservative Revolution or today’s New Right. This puts Jewry in the crosshairs of every attempt to restore the smooth self-enclosure of regional cultural units with no inherent connection to each other in their “organic” ebb and flow. Unsurprisingly, as we will see, the Jewish question thus loomed fairly large in Rosenstock-Huessy’s vision of planetary unity in diversity as the anonymous Christian future, always contrasted to a pagan splintering of time and space within an impersonally deified natural process. The underlying framework of the Cross of Reality remains implicit in his 1946 essay “Planetary Man. In Memoriam Oswald Spengler,” marking a decade since the meaningfully timed passing of the thinker Rosenstock-Huessy respectfully sees as his formidable adversary; for Spengler had just enough time to foresee the downfall of Germany that had now come to pass according to his painfully revised schedule. This is something Rosenstock-Huessy felt he had to get out of the way in prefacing a 1958 lecture to a German audience:

Endless mockery has been poured on Spengler’s *Decline of the West*. But at least Mr. Spengler, upon dying in 1936, did say: “In ten years, no German Reich will even exist!” He was an evil man of genius, but a man of genius nonetheless. And he had not shied from saying: I can recognize decline. There stood against this the optimism of the professors of French and German and Spanish and Italian history.¹⁰²

That is, of the academics who clung to the national categories of the second-millennium revolutions, made obsolete in the third millennium the world wars had ushered in by their global scope itself as their inherent revolutionary character, making way for Planetary Man.¹⁰³ Spengler at least deserved credit for signing the old world’s death certificate with his own life and thought, typical of the *fin-de-siècle* mood and “the philosophies of the ash-can” that proliferated since “the year of grace 1890,” when “God had died in Europe,” as Rosenstock-

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ The fourfold Cross of Reality may be comparable in this to the later McLuhan’s tetrad, whereby each new medium at once intensifies, obsolesces, retrieves, and flips into four other media’s unique configurations of the human sensorium in space and time. McLuhan may well owe more to Rosenstock-Huessy than he lets on with a single reference to *Out of Revolution* in Marshall and Eric McLuhan, *Laws of Media. The New Science*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 82.

¹⁰² Rosenstock-Huessy, “Die Gesetze der christlichen Zeitrechnung,” 331.

¹⁰³ Bernard Charbonneau likewise dated the planetary third millennium from the Hiroshima bombing in a 1945 lecture about its significance entitled “An Deux Mille,” translated by Louis Cancelmi as *The Year 2000*. www.signals-noise.com/2017/03/17/bernard-charbonneau-political-ecology/ (Accessed April 22, 2022).

Huessy asserted in the opening line of his essay, just after the dedication: “Fulfill your genius: that vocation / Shall be your sole denomination.” He puts the original in a footnote:

Erfüllst Du deine genius Pflicht, frag ich nach Deinem Glauben nicht.’ —written of Spengler in my “*The Suicide of Europe*” (1919).—E.R.-H. ¹⁰⁴

He had then used the phrase to acknowledge the liberation from idealism brought about by Spengler, with his mighty blow from another side against a common enemy, since his own critique of Spengler was never meant to suggest that “today’s cultured person or today’s science are truer and worthier of life than this brilliant settling of accounts [*geniale Abrechnung*] with both. On the contrary!”¹⁰⁵ It was “the greater men of this period between two worlds —of this pause between two inhalations of the spirit—” who looked back on Georges Bernanos’s *Grands cimetières sous la lune* (as earlier on Matthew Arnold’s “Dover Beach”) and “enjoyed the cleverness of the intellect, its power to know that the dead are dead. One of these was Spengler,” whose boast of dying consciously “gives the clue to the separate mind which must always surge up when the unifying spirit is taken from it.”¹⁰⁶ And yet, like all of us as “the children of the future and therefore the parents of history,” he also “takes his clue from the ‘inevitable’ future; and in that light —of the predicted end of the West— he re-writes the past.”

In this he is a true genius. Most historians are unaware of the eternal truth that history is the re-writing of the past as fruits from the tree of the future. The gospel of Matthew, for instance, begins by re-writing, in its first chapter, the whole of Jewish history in the light of the new aeon. Why not, then, let Spengler re-write history in the paradigm of the fall of Europe? There is no objection. I myself have written a history of the last thousand years in the light of their end in these world wars. Furthermore, my ‘Christianity and Europe,’ whose publication in 1918 synchronised precisely with that of Spengler’s *magnum opus*, was a series of essays assuming the end of Europe and the beginning of a Slav millennium.¹⁰⁷

Though he had concurred in this with Spengler’s sense that a new Russian civilization lay in the near future, Rosenstock-Huessy remained his rival and no impartial critic in the area of Europe and the Western world, where however he felt so secure that he could profit by Spengler’s suggestions whenever they completed or confirmed his own findings. His quarrel was more with Spengler’s insistence on pigeonholing civilization in half a dozen sealed boxes, which betrayed “his anti-Christian bias:”

for we can only understand all climes and ages if there is one spirit in and by which they can be known. We owe what power we have to be anything more than the products of time, space and the environment to this—though we ourselves are forms of the expression of time, space and environment, we also live from beyond the grave backward into this world: we are sent into it not just to see but to see *through* it. Every word that Spengler knows about Egypt, Greece, etc., and about all the Renaissances

¹⁰⁴ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Planetary Man*. In *Memoriam Oswald Spengler*. Reprinted from the *New English Weekly* of May 30th, June 6th, and June 13th, 1946, 3.

¹⁰⁵ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Die Hochzeit des Krieges und der Revolution*, 192.

¹⁰⁶ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Planetary Man*, 4.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 5. Rosenstock-Huessy revisited his essay questioning Novalis’s equation of *Die Christenheit oder Europa* in light of America joining the Great War in *Die Sprache des Menschengeschlechts*, Vol. II, 300-319.

of our era, rests upon the recognition of people long dead whose spirit is resurrected in his work. Spengler speaks out of the spirit that he denies.¹⁰⁸

Spengler must also deny that the Decline of the West is not limited to its original landscape but has become the business of the entire planet and all mankind, culminating in the world wars that have swept them in the ultimate revolution. The downfall is completed, “but the calamity is more than European and more than Western, for the West imposed its industry and its nationalism upon the whole globe,” and “the ideas and values of the West gave to the entire world a common, intelligible pattern which disintegrates with their decline.” The globalized world brought into being by the revolutionary dynamics of the Christian West cannot revert into “separate parts” as a new set of civilizational boxes “(which might be a kind of re-integration) but into one soup of confusion.”¹⁰⁹

Therefore, for all souls that would save themselves, whether from the East, West or centre, there is but one salvation—they must become Planetary Men. They must exercise once again the eternal privilege of the soul, which is to resurrect into new times and new spaces, beyond the grave of its hopes and the wreck of its ruined mansions.¹¹⁰

“Western Man—bow to Spengler! But Planetary Man” is to shake off his spell of clinical detachment to embrace the certainty “that we are not physicians of our society but its members,” living in remembrance of a common body and drawing on “the unexhausted soil of a genuine future,” to be discerned and cleaved to over against “a time in which his being would be wholly contained in any one culture of the West, East, North or South. The separation between these spacial [*sic*] cultures has been annihilated in that millennium to which Spengler has given the apt and significant name of ‘Faustian.’ No part of the planet is any longer remote from us; we are no longer living in the same world as were the Adam and Eve of Milton’s poem. The very grandeur which was formerly suggested by the adjective ‘world,’ in such terms as world-war, world-trade, world-conquest and so forth is derived from man’s previous existence in spaces of earth, sea and sky untravelled and uncharted, between horizons vanishing into the unknown and the infinite.” By contrast, “‘the planet’ signifies the Earth separated off from the cosmos by our astronomy, mapped by our geography, laced by our systems of communication—Man’s own conquest and possession: and—which is politically most important—this is the aspect of our habitation which has now become common and familiar to the minds of men.”¹¹¹

As soon as a man recognises this, and knows that he cannot be an Eastern or a Western Man only—alas, to cease to be one is not to so easy! — something is changed in his spirit, for he can no longer regard himself as merely a part of the world; an exclusively ‘immanentist’ philosophy has become impossible. He must begin to take seriously the eternal distinctions between God, Man and the World.¹¹²

Rosenstock-Huessy is alluding here to the three points of the base triangle of *The Star of Redemption*, as worked out in his friend Franz Rosenzweig’s *magnum opus* around the same time as he was himself grappling with Spengler’s *Decline*. It laid out this interplay of existential poles

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 5-6.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 6.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 6-7.

¹¹² Ibid.

as the Biblical template of reality and the key to their post-Idealist New Thinking. In his *Sociology*, Rosenstock-Huessy would identify the themes of the first, second and third millennia of the Christian era with God, World and Man respectively.¹¹³ But in “Planetary Man,” he seems to find the very word “World” too ambiguous in the post-war context, carrying the risk of “seeing ourselves as part and parcel of its unknown and infinite forces” and human issues as “problems of the natural world,”¹¹⁴ “as though the planet could swallow us up like atoms of the universe.”¹¹⁵ On the contrary, “the ‘planet’ appears as an object which Man, through his societies, may have to organise: he cannot be simply an outgrowth of it.” Rosenstock-Huessy underlines a distinction which the contemporary pagan personification of the Planet as Gaia by Deep Ecology may obfuscate today even more than in his own time, going hand in hand with the compensating “strategic essentialism” (Gayatri Spivak) of uprooted identity politics from right and left.

Man can no more be an epiphenomenon of Nature than mind can be an epiphenomenon of Man. These are things that are abidingly *different*, and when once [*sic*] that is realised we can no longer sacrifice our lives to dale and grove, nor to the idol of Western Civilization, nor to upholding the schism between Western and Eastern Christendom, nor to European hegemony; nor can we look down upon ‘Asiatics’ or label the Jews, who are at the heart of our tradition, as only ‘Orientals’: to label any human being with the name of a territory or a point of the compass begins to sound false in the dawn of this Planetary era. From such personifications of the accidental predicates of Man, came the major fallacies of the great geographical age; for Man can never be merely what he is in any particular time, climate and territory; if he were no more than that he could not have survived.¹¹⁶

It is because man’s mind stands out from and over against any given environment that he can shape it in turn and not simply risk disappearing with any change of the set of conditions into which he was born and to which he has adapted, unlike most other creatures.

True these climates and territories are mightily important, mightily decisive for our ways of life. But we are also altering them, our ancestors did much to make them what they are. The landscape which was the object of their labours, bears their paternal likeness and is their child—it is not only, as Spengler thought, the mother of us all. In their capacity of founding fathers our forbears made the land what it is: and, of course, since all love is sacrificial, that which is loved by us ultimately consumes us: that is true even of God, who became Man because he loved Man; and because Man loves the Earth he becomes the land.¹¹⁷

In Eden, “Man was given dominion over the Earth for that purpose. In attaining planetary consciousness we come back again to this primordial commandment; we have now to dress and to keep the planet, the whole planet.”¹¹⁸ As Rosenstock-Huessy put it in a typed draft of

¹¹³ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Soziologie*, Vol. II: *Die Vollzahl der Zeiten*, 633ff.

¹¹⁴ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Planetary Man*, 8.

¹¹⁵ Rosenstock-Huessy, typed alternate draft of “Planetary Man,” 6.

¹¹⁶ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Planetary Man*, 8.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 8-9.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 9.

this text, “the service of our globe is a serious command,”¹¹⁹ one to which he would devote his book *Dienst auf dem Planeten*, expanding to the whole world his lifelong project of voluntary work camps to develop civilian service as a substitute for military virtues.¹²⁰ This calling leads him “beyond Spengler’s chronological scheme” to “assess the place which Spengler holds in the mental steps towards planetary living.”¹²¹ Turning the tables of cross-temporal contemporaneity on the world-historian for whom “Jesus is a mere ‘Oriental,’ Luther is merely a Faustian Westerner” rather than the St. Paul redivivus he fancies himself to be, Rosenstock-Huessy inscribes his nemesis within unbroken Church history. For “with Spengler, we are back to Marcion,”¹²² “the Christian heretic of the second century”¹²³ who like him “rejected the unity of history: he divided the time of Man upon this Earth into two water-tight compartments, just as Spengler does with his six ‘boxes’ of cultures, which are ‘history-tight’ against one another. Marcion said that the God of the Old Testament, the one who had created Heaven and Earth, and the God of the New Testament were two different Gods.” Spengler is even more polytheistic but spares his decadent readers the embarrassment of God-talk. “Instead he speaks of the ‘spirits’ of the various landscapes, which remain mutually exclusive and impenetrable.”¹²⁴

The ruling passion of the two men is the same: both are driven by the same inordinate desire to deny the full measure of gratitude which Man owes to his Maker. In both there is a burning hatred against the revelation which came through the Jews, that all history is one, must be treated as one and has to become one. By Marcion and by Spengler, world-history was rewritten from the postulate that the discovery of Israel must be eliminated—obliterated in its double meaning, both the original revelation and the fact that, through Christ, that revelation was gradually communicated to the Gentiles.¹²⁵

This was Christianity’s mission according to Rosenzweig: spreading to the ends of the earth in universal history the animating radiance whose source all the while remained concentrated in the burning coal of Israel’s timeless and unchanging relation to the Eternal. Rosenzweig and Rosenstock agreed that the partially conflicting Biblical revelations to which they each bore witness were nonetheless complementary in their respective callings to Man from God and for the World. They even extended their own fruitful dialogue of irreducible differences to larger “symblismatic, group-founding events” (in Rosenstock-Huessy’s idiosyncratic parlance), such as publishing ventures whose “apocalyptic mood contrasted with Spengler’s pessimism because it consisted of the strong belief in a new life”¹²⁶ beyond the dead ends of world war and revolution, which they sought to articulate in a book series called *Die Bücher vom Kreuzweg* (a crossroads clearly patterned on the Cross of Reality) for the

¹¹⁹ Rosenstock-Huessy, typed alternate draft of “Planetary Man,” 8.

¹²⁰ Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, *Dienst auf dem Planeten. Kurzweil und Langeweile im Dritten Jahrtausend* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1965).

¹²¹ Rosenstock-Huessy, typed alternate draft of “Planetary Man,” 8

¹²² *Ibid.*, 12.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹²⁴ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Planetary Man*, 9.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹²⁶ Knut Martin Stünkel, “Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy’s Early Symblismatic Experiences – The Sociology of *Patmos* and *Die Kreatur*,” *Culture, Theory and Critique* 56/1 (2015): 15. Referring to G. Weismantel, “Begegnungen: Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy und Leo Weismantel,” in *Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy – Denker und Gestalter*, ed. Lothar Bossle (Würzburg: Creator, 1989), 92-109.

Christians among them. “The catastrophe of the Great War as interpreted by the thoroughly pessimistic and, for Rosenstock-Huessy and his friends more decisively, pagan Spengler, supplied the trigger for a different approach that was expressed by the title of *Patmos*”¹²⁷ chosen for their publishing house and influential circle in the aftermath of Germany’s defeat (1919-1923). Overlapping with that of the subsequent ecumenical review *Die Kreatur* (1927-1930), this *Patmos*-Kreis found itself facing off against the “circle of minds” in which Spengler was active, as Rosenstock-Huessy claimed to know from talking with him. “It was the very same circle in which Klages, Stefan George for some part of his life, and finally Hitler himself came under the influence of Schuler, who was the Grey Eminence of this group,”¹²⁸ the Munich Cosmic Circle of occultist literati. “And one of the things they accepted as axiomatic was that Israel and the whole Hebraic background of the Christian Church had to be denied, buried, abolished at all costs.”¹²⁹ Alfred Schuler thought of himself as the reincarnated *ultimus paganorum* from healthy heathen times before the scourge of Christianity unleashed the rationalizing decadence that thwarted Life’s cyclical movement, symbolized by the swastika cross that both the George-Kreis and the Nazi movement would appropriate.¹³⁰ Rosenstock-Huessy has described how, at the height of the former’s prestige, turning against humanistic Renaissance hero-worship as a student in 1906 upon realizing how “the nominatives of knowledge [*Erkenntnis*] rest upon the vocatives of recognition [*Anerkennung*],” he became vaccinated once and for all “against the smoke circles of Stefan George, Spengler, Marx, Nietzsche. Thereafter I was never again tempted to put on the same level criminal and superman.”¹³¹

Schuler died in 1923, two years after the publication of a classic of Church history that Rosenstock-Huessy saw as the answer to what he represented. for “it cannot be called an accident that [Adolf von] Harnack’s book on Marcion was coincident with Spengler. Harnack wrote on the great model of his own contemporary. And Harnack showed the way out beyond Marcion,” detailing how “the Roman Church shuddered when she saw the consequences of this anti-Judaic bias,” since “the Marcionites had to hate the flesh and marriage and the creatures of this earth because these had existed before Christ and had been created by a power alien to the New God.” By contrast, “the Church universal insisted on the full measure of gratitude men owed to their maker from the beginning of time to the end, in one unbroken stream of history, across Egypt, across Israel, across Hellas and Rome. Marriage, and culture, and art, and republics and philosophy, not one of them were meaningless. They did not have to be worshipped as idols. But they were not devoid of perpetual meaning for those who received the whole created world from the hands of the creator.”¹³² Conversely, “we remain responsible to God for what may come back,” and what may not, e.g. the “homosexuality, perpetual war, slavery, meat market [*Fleischbeschau*]” that Rosenstock-Huessy associates with “far from noble Plato”: unfit for rebirth, these lead back to ruin.¹³³ With another rationale than Marcion’s bisecting of time but no better result in its wider splintering, “according to Spengler, five-sixths of the created history of mankind are not ours. The desired result is that

¹²⁷ Stünkel, “Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy’s Early Symblysmatic Experiences,” 15.

¹²⁸ Rosenstock-Huessy, typed alternate draft of “Planetary Man,” 9.

¹²⁹ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Planetary Man*, 10.

¹³⁰ It may be in part as a retort to the George-Kreis practice of having an emblematic rounded swastika on its books with Georg Bondi Verlag that Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy’s *Cross of Reality* (a Greek cross with arrowheads on its four ends) faces the title page of his *Speech and Reality* (Norwich, VT: Argo Books, 1970).

¹³¹ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Ja und Nein*, 64-65.

¹³² Rosenstock-Huessy, typed alternate draft of “Planetary Man,” 11.

¹³³ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Ja und Nein*, 66.

the one connecting link, the revelation of the One God in all history laid down in the Bible, can be eliminated. [...] Illusion was everything which made men of the second millennium of our era read the Bible or sing mass. Achilles and Christ and Siegfried, or Faust, were three myths of the 'boxes' of mother-born spirits or cultures. God ceased to be the father of all spirits."

There was to be no One God any more; and since there would be no One-and-the-same-God, Israel had never really existed. The Jews were a nightmare—parasites and usurers—and Spengler's work punished them, as Marcion's did, with the most comprehensive of anathemas, that of omission. As for the Church Universal, it was to be divided at the roots—the Eastern Byzantine Church regarded as a mere balcony or bay-window of an Oriental civilization; and St. Francis became a poor relation of Faust, assisting in the incarnation of 'the West.'¹³⁴

This deliberate repudiation of the unity of mankind preached and enacted by the Judaeo-Christian tradition provides the unmistakable background of Spengler's admonition to the West to die of the very pride that was decimating it in a world war, having no reality outside of the time bracket he allotted it, "from 1,000 to 2,200 A.D."

Do not attempt to jump out of this magic circle which my powerful disbelief draws around you. Die you must. There is no place for your soul except here, within the mother-landscape of the West. Go back to your mother: she will take you back into her womb. Man is his mother's son [How true!] and he is nothing else [Obviously untrue!]"

Such was the gist of Spengler's 'sermon of death'; and it was acceptable doctrine to the circle in which he moved. It would be frightful, unbearable, to others—to the bridegroom, for instance, who leaves his father and mother to cleave to the woman of his choice and become, through her, the ancestor of a new nation. But Klages, Schuler, Spengler, Hitler and Stefan George were all unmarried, all either homosexual, under-sexed or otherwise abnormal. The idea that Man's soul is limited to its relations to the ancestral spirits, backward in time, did not have the same terror for these men.

Their ghastly heresy was not however of merely personal origin. There does exist, in the soul of the West, a tendency to regression, a drag back towards the spirit of 'matriarchy.' It is the undertow beneath the tide of 'progress,' and perhaps the further West, the stronger it is.¹³⁵

"What illumination by charity, by hope and faith will be needed in the United States of America before it can attain to planetary consciousness!"¹³⁶ Rosenstock-Huessy therefore exclaims. And yet, he does find a saving grace in his adoptive country, ever tempted to retreat into fortified comfort zones and airtight safe spaces. For in the "dynamic of the American frontier the history of all frontiers is recapitulated," now that "the nations have broken out of their frontiers in a violent act of *interpenetration*" that also causes those of Russia and the United States to overlap in Europe. To be sure, "Europe could, in theory, be held to that function of being a glaciais," as the Morgenthau Plan briefly envisioned for Germany, to the dismay of *émigrés* like Rosenstock-Huessy and Paul Tillich. "That would be the pagan and

¹³⁴ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Planetary Man*, 10.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

reactionary solution.”¹³⁷ More likely, “this is a stage in the progressive abandonment of frontier-lines between the spaces of God’s Earth — a spiritual process which began when the monks left the fertile valley of the Nile and chose to live in the desert as God’s country,”¹³⁸ and was given a free rein in the New World by the Puritans who made the latter vision America’s founding myth.

The speed of conquest was such that the experience of change is predominant in Americans of all generations, they all have less sentiment for any definite place and form of settlement than for the life of movement towards new horizons. In this respect, no American is able to read in Spengler exactly what Spengler wrote—the landscape has never been a mother to any American in the sense in which a European thinks of his motherland. An American may, perhaps, try to worship the mother-spirit of the landscape after the Spenglerian manner, but only by a sentimental effort: for every American is a pluralist who lives and has lived in a number of landscapes: and although Spengler’s brilliant descriptions may hold his intellect spell bound, his imagination will still be roving restlessly over more than one continent.¹³⁹

Rosenstock-Huessy would keep wrestling with the superpower parochialism of Cold War America and the grip that “Greek” academic thinking, rehashed from decadent Europe, still had on the public and his students alike. He still felt that Planetary Man was “assured by his title to rise beyond geography.” For “if he does not achieve that much, the massacre must continue, on frontiers, lands, races, etc. Planetary Man is that minimum concept below which we cannot even physically survive,” and whereby “Man at least admits that his local roots are conditioned by world-wide conditions. He will have home and land and tastes of an indigenous character, but he will recognize them as planetary functions and as subject to forestry, pruning, grafting, cutting back of branches,” as intended for him in the Garden of Eden. Not that he expected the third millennium’s reintegration of it in a harmony of the local and the global to be untroubled, though “the dangers of the planetary man concept probably lie farther ahead than its virtues.” “The highly probable attempts to deduce too much from such a concept, may be mediocre and uninspiring” —or even irritating, as attested by our own day’s wild overreactions to all glibly “globalist” discourse, tapping into a tempting undercurrent of rejection of the West’s defining Judaic element of concern for all Creation regardless of borders. Mindful of that religious core of Europe’s revolutionary history, Rosenstock-Huessy’s call to “behave as citizens of this planet and as immigrants into a planetary function” thus remained an essentially prayerful one. “‘Our’ daily bread, for instance, must be bread for all men. And as the heavens rotate and revolve as one great firmament, His will certainly is not done on earth as in heaven as long as the earth is not one for us.” This planetary revolution to finally join heaven and earth still begins with “a negative statement”¹⁴⁰ about what to reject as dead, as well as discernment about what to draw new life from, in light of the Cross of Reality as the ever-shifting push-and-pull between near and far: both inside and outside, past and future. But if “the life of civilization is eternally recurrent,” and in that sense “immortal,” it is inasmuch as “the fear of its last hour is kept present by frank criticism.”

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 14.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁴⁰ Rosenstock-Huessy, typed alternate draft of “Planetary Man,” 21.

The famous critical power of the Western world is one of its most important Christian qualities. This inner criticism of institutions from the point of view of their death has made them eternal. Papacy exists today, in spite of all odds and in spite of all its enemies. England and France exist in spite of the proletarian revolution. The anticipation of a Last Judgment looming over our own civilization is the best remedy against its inevitable downfall. This is the paradoxical wisdom of European revolutions.¹⁴¹

No less paradoxically, this planetary eschatological horizon they were all groping for is also what “frees man from the Western world and its futility:”¹⁴² talk of decline, palingenesis or utopia. As Rosenstock-Huessy told one of his last classes:

You are already in the third millennium. You are after Spengler. You see, the world in which we move today, or begin to move is a beginning, gentlemen. It's not an end. It could be for you if you wanted. [...] that was the whole point with my contemporaries, with the Thomas Manns, and all these Prousts, these philosophers of decadence. I was never interested. [...] I said, "You are right, so I must make a new beginning. I cannot be your contemporary. If you already foresee the end, I can anticipate the end. [...] what's that to me? I simply assume that you are right. You see, that will run its course. It's over with." And that has saved me. I mean, Mr. Spengler and myself have [...] very close contact. He's the last. I'm the first. And because I was taught by him. He had done something which [...] doesn't need to be repeated. If one man—the same is true of Proust—if one man jumps into the abyss, *A la recherche du temps perdu*, you see, I can perhaps be on the "A la recherche de temps nouveau[x]." Why not?¹⁴³

VI. Critical Remarks and Envoi: In Search of Time Lost and Regained as Post-Christian Future Runs Out

The above statement brings into sharp relief what Rosenstock-Huessy shares with Spengler, and what sets them apart as “distemporaries.” Rosenstock-Huessy readily grants the decline and fall of the West, but is not too concerned about them, as he already lives on the Planet of which the West was the chrysalis and has no interest in hanging on to its dead husk. Where Spengler wants to stoically go down with a sinking ship, assuming seas between cultures cannot be crossed, Rosenstock-Huessy takes the dive, reaching for new ground beyond them. That may be better than carrying on as a zombie civilization, with no soul other than a hopeless power play to stave off physical decay for another day, as a kneejerk conservative reflex. It sets up a contrast between Spengler seeing himself as the last Roman soldier at his post while the old Empire crumbles around him, and Rosenstock-Huessy as an early Christian witness to a new dispensation that creates another world beyond the limitations of space and death. However, that One World the West made also has its limits: those of the planet as a human habitat. They have been reached when a geological era named after human impact is as such one in which the planet becomes largely unfit for human habitation or at least for civilization as we know it. Spenglerians seem ill-equipped to integrate the Anthropocene as a factor in their prognostications and are thus apt to dismiss the issue as “climate hysteria.” This is understandable, since the Anthropocene overturns the geopolitical chessboard of

¹⁴¹ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Out of Revolution*, 561.

¹⁴² Rosenstock-Huessy, typed alternate draft of “Planetary Man,” 21.

¹⁴³ Rosenstock-Huessy, *Greek Philosophy* - 1956 Vol 16 - Lecture 22 - Jan 10, 1957 Lecture, 24.

world-history on which they are used to playing.¹⁴⁴ Being in the same planetary sinking boat renders somewhat moot the competing patterns of civilizational deckchair arrangements in the face of melting ice caps, rising sea levels, the Gulf Stream grinding to a halt, and Europe turning tundra as deserts cover the tropics. Such prospects are no less real for enacting Faustian Man's self-fulfilling prophecy of bringing the world to its end in bringing all its ends into a common world, united in fear and expectation of its coming end as both termination and final cause. Rosenstock-Huessy can help us see how the Anthropocene seals the globalized West's literalization of the Christian revelation of a new heaven and a new earth with direct reach to all of Creation beyond local jurisdiction (superseded from the Papal See to Universal Human Rights), mutual isolation (precluded by Capital/Technique), or lateral friend/enemy distinctions (overtaken by the leading edge of the "providential" progress of world-unification in peril and promise). Being "already in the third millennium," we also see that Rosenstock-Huessy's charged eschatological use of this fixed thousand-year unit is likely no more helpful than Spengler's cyclical one in grasping how the Anthropocene apex of Faustian culture may make an end of all cultures.

For all Rosenstock-Huessy's talk of a post-modern Christian future outrunning both traditional religion and secular civilization, there seems to be only so much of it to go around. "Rosenstock-Huessy never hints at the possibility of a fourth millennium. On the contrary, he seems to imply that the third is the last," e.g., by correlating Christianity's "three millennia with several groups of three, such as faith, love, and hope,"¹⁴⁵ on the pattern of Joachim of Fiore, the apocalyptic prophet of the Franciscan Revolution, who added to Marcion's assignment of the Old Testament to the Father and of the New to the Son by raising hopes of a third Age of the Spirit to come, and of Schelling's three ages of the Church: Petrine (Roman), Pauline (universal), Johannine (post-institutional as global society itself). Factoring in the Hebrew calendar, this saddles Rosenstock-Huessy with the same half-dozen kiloyear boxes as Spengler to shoehorn historical periods into, only differently arranged, with Biblical/religious instead of "Greek"/scientific assumptions. Dispensing with transcendental post-history, and leaving his own prophesied future millennium to bring about against all odds the chronological fullness of time and meaning, Rosenstock-Huessy's outline of history, despite a keen sense of *longue durée*, ends up as at best a blip in Deep Time, that the Anthropocene could even foreshorten to a few more decades¹⁴⁶ Spengler's account of contingent great cultures and their thousand-year arcs unevenly spread across time and space might appear modestly open-ended in comparison, since it does not foreclose the appearance of different ones far into the distant future. It is just that Spengler's commitment to naturalistic relativism makes him downplay the implications of the West morphing into the World, so that Faustian culture's decline and fall may well be those of human civilization as such.

Both Spengler and Rosenstock-Huessy recognize in this global reach the effect of a peculiar regional strand and mutant strain of Christianity, bent on materializing its universal spiritual vocation. Rosenstock-Huessy's fulsome embrace of that process as culminating in the post-secular ecumenicism of Planetary Man (not so different a scenario from that

¹⁴⁴ "Not the interest of the planet, but that of European peoples must be in the center," David Engels insists in "'Neue' und 'alte' Werte," *Cato* 3 (2019): 28.

¹⁴⁵ Morgan, *Speech and Society*, 150n1.

¹⁴⁶ See such a critique at the end of Christian Roy, "Révélation et révolution : la double matrice d'une Nouvelle Pensée du langage. Note de lecture sur Wayne Cristaudo, *Religion, Redemption, and Revolution. The New Speech Thinking of Franz Rosenzweig and Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2012, 590 pages," *PhaenEx* vol. 11, no. 2 (2016): 239-255, <http://phaenex.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/phaenex/article/view/4783/3994>.

envisaged by Toynbee as a Christian-based religious synthesis¹⁴⁷) makes him read his own prophecy back into Christianity's history as its foreshadowing, overriding the self-understanding of really existing Christians from the faith's origins to our times. The division of that history into mutually exclusive thousand-year blocks that therefore need to follow each other in time in a closed triadic series betrays the same conceptual spatialization into objective substances as the other Western inflections to the "Magian" body of early Christianity at the turn of the second millennium. Among these may be mentioned the growing institutionalization of Church and State as a result of their competition over the same spatialized time, the onto-theological twist of dialectics introduced into the Trinity with the *filioque* clause, and most decisively (as Rosenstock-Huessy argued), the redundant doubling of the feast of All Saints with that of All Souls that made every subject an individual object of concern, independently of timeless inner/ecclesial communion with/in God as the original meaning of sanctification: both life in Christ and communion of saints.¹⁴⁸ The latter "mystical" experience of the early Church as All Saints of all times in timeless communion, typically Magian, and the former "modern" individual piety of post-mortem justification for All Souls in terms of time, typically Faustian, both seem to be dismissed as "childish" by Rosenstock-Huessy.¹⁴⁹ There would be some grounds to probe his professed Christian orthodoxy with a pointed *Gretchenfrage* about what he means by it, since for him, the Cross and Resurrection do not have the inseparably literal and symbolic meaning they hold in traditional Christian faith, but simply function as an allegorical template for sociological reconstruction in response to historical challenges, a "new stratagem of social survival" for future generations.¹⁵⁰ They are not about the eternal life of individuals, who are only "resurrected" as social types when they form a school in historical time, e.g. Christians as re-embodiments of Christ in the same way that Freudians reembody Freud; so much for the personal salvation of All Souls that mobilized the West for its Faustian destiny through most of its history!

¹⁴⁷ See Arnold Toynbee's Oxford lecture "Christianity and Civilization" (from *Civilization on Trial*. Oxford University Press, 1948, <http://www.myriobiblos.gr/texts/english/toynbee.html>): "We seem to see a series of different kinds of society succeeding one another in this world. As the primitive species of societies has given place to a second species known as the civilizations within the brief period of the last six thousand years, so this second species of local and ephemeral societies may perhaps give place in its turn to a third species embodied in a single world-wide and enduring representative in the shape of the Christian Church", "as the social heir of all the other churches and all the civilizations," albeit still as a visible institution and not as anonymously as Rosenstock-Huessy expects. This hardly seems to justify his rash judgment of Toynbee as a fake Christian hiding a less consistent pagan than Spengler, when in fact their contemporary assessments of Christian world civilization are quite similar.

¹⁴⁸ This contrast between All Saints and All Souls is echoed in the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor, part of Dostoevsky's Orthodox critique of the Western Christendom it defines. There, saints are portrayed as a small elite of spiritual heroes glorified at the Last Judgment as already gods in Christ, while the Church takes care of the broad masses of mere humans looking for security through history until then, giving them what they need with the institutionalization of love (in itself as unpredictable as the Samaritan's act) in worldly terms. This is the temptation in the desert Christ refused and the Antichrist embodies with his philanthropic claims for instrumental means, as Ivan Illich argues, likely with this parable in mind in critiquing Christianity's "corruption" or institutional development into modernity through Rosenstock-Huessy's less than holy European Revolutions. See Luca Pisto's final dissertation *Corruptio optimi pessima. Istituzione e persona nel pensiero di Ivan Illich* (Università degli Studi di Torino, Scuola di Scienze Umanistiche, Corso di Laurea triennale in Filosofia, 2017), 22ff.

https://www.academia.edu/40392120/Corruptio_Optimi_Pessima_istituzione_e_persona_nel_pensiero_di_Ivan_Illich

¹⁴⁹ Cristaudo, "Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy."

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

The frontier conditions of the Western reaches of Christendom probably help explain their hallmark millenarian anxiety about expansion in space and its projection in clock time as a regular addition of punctiform units. The resulting Faustian passion for distant horizons to colonize and totalize was a crucial departure from the ancient and Eastern Churches, where monastic spirituality and liturgical life still vouchsafe a new *Aion* as a timeless deified mode of existence they incarnate within time: a Kingdom available in the heart and not to be sought primarily in outer circumstances on a historical schedule. Thus, even as the Transfiguration as a glimpse of that age of the Kingdom “to come” is the model for a spirituality of uncreated light that already deifies contemplatives as its eschatological prophets,¹⁵¹ the millennium is normally not read as a future period but as the whole of cosmic time until its mysterious intersection—anticipated in Church life but historically unpredictable—with the Second Coming of Christ.

The Spenglerian “second religiosity” already evident in the post-secular crisis of Faustian culture seems to be acting as an opening for the rediscovery and recovery of older, non-Western ways of experiencing time, no longer as chronological history, but as the fractal recurrence of archetypal patterns of temporal manifestation of the Eternal, less as everlastingness than as simultaneity in a timeless present given at every moment. We can thus see re-emerging, aside from neo-pagan, indigenous, and Oriental spiritualities, a Magian Christian understanding of the play of symbolic patterns as the structure of reality, being applied in real time to the interpretation of the asymptotic acceleration of Faustian world history, cancelling space in no time.¹⁵² A “time-bridge” is thus forming to another “second religiosity”: that of the late Roman world where Christianity was born and eventually took over not just as a secondary phenomenon of decadence, but as the primal ground of refoundations and new foundations in East and West, reiterated across the centuries down to both Faustian and Russian culture, in Spengler’s terms —giving the lie to his denial of the possibility of meaningful, vital transfers between cultures across space and time. Rosenstock-Huessy was wiser to the potential for retrievals of former cultural emphases. Yet the Faustian chronological futurity he still worked within now shows signs of both acceleration and breakdown, as though receding behind us as a thing of the historical past made both available and erasable by post-modernity, even as its deadly consequences seem to be rushing towards us from the future. Perhaps the (post-)Christian future as he understood it has run out when the world it drove forward ends up over the cliff of the third millennium, hanging in mid-air between contrasting outcomes that both imply humanity’s demise: the scheduled Singularity of its eschatological supersession in transhumanism’s “spiritual machines” meant to absorb the cosmos in divinely virtual reality, and the Anthropocene era of its geological subsumption in the Sixth Great Extinction, where it may well revert to bare subsistence over untold millennia like those of prehistory, past the conditions for which it then evolved. The exacerbation of Faustian culture’s sense of time —as pressing judgment between looming

¹⁵¹ See Christian Roy, “A Symbolic Meditation on Hiroshima at 75: Divine-Human Transfiguration and Transhuman Disfiguration” *The Symbolic World* (August 6, 2020), <https://thesymbolicworld.com/articles/a-symbolic-meditation-on-hiroshima-at-75-divine-human-transfiguration-and-transhuman-disfiguration/> (Accessed April 22, 2022).

¹⁵² I am referring to the remarkable online movement that has developed over the last five years around Canadian Orthodox iconographer Jonathan Pageau’s prolific cultural commentary and his blog *TheSymbolicWorld.com*, making him a fixture of the so-called “Intellectual Dark Web.” His on-going video interview series with Richard Rohlin, about Universal History and its “pre-Faustian” or non-Western Christian symbolic interpretations in terms of recurrent mythical foundations and correlations between spatial and temporal ends of the known world may be particularly apposite as illustrations of this “Magian” revival, in contrast to the Faustian autobiographies of Western Man under discussion here.

doom and leaps of faith in a future that keeps the end at bay for a while— is becoming palpable in its most “mythic” artistic expression, i.e., Hollywood cinema. Science-fiction films like Christopher Nolan’s *Interstellar* (2014) and *Tenet* (2020) or Denis Villeneuve’s *Arrival* (2016) explicitly deal with the nature and experience of time, heightening awareness of clock time even as they point beyond it, as it unfolds in both standard directions at once, and indeed, independently of causality, since protagonists follow a call to avert the end of time from a future premised on their answer to it in an all-at-once perception of events as fluid-yet-fated *Gestalten*.¹⁵³ Their being is remade as a temporal paradox, with no cause but a formal one within a symbolic pattern arising through time from out of time to save the world of ordinary present life. Its *telos* is thus bound up with a non-competitive “alien” grammar of love for particular beings as mortal individuals whose fates intertwine as microcosmic narrative wholes—e.g., in preparation for a macrocosmic ordeal *Arrival* even sets three thousand years hence, as though to both echo and subvert Rosenstock-Huessy’s millennial triad.

A century before this current shift in narrative patterns, beholden to thousand-year dramatic units, Rosenstock-Huessy and Spengler arguably both wrote in Proust’s *fin-de-millénaire* memoir fiction genre. Rosenstock-Huessy conceived his *Autobiography of Western Man* as Spengler published his *Decline of the West*; understanding it as a Faustian biographical novel.¹⁵⁴ This makes them colleagues of Proust, who also wrote his novel to end the novel concurrently with the war to end all war. These world-historians can thus be read in light of the great novel of all time, and vice versa. Rosenstock-Huessy overlooks that, just as *Western Man*’s history, Proust’s *Recherche* issues in *Le Temps retrouvé*—a revealed fullness of time, in tune with the eschatological scheme driving European revolutions as end-time prophecy to retrospectively confer meaning on lived time’s autobiographical retelling. Like Rosenstock-Huessy, Proust weaves his narrative around the recalling to life of the names of people and places to bring their embodied particularity to play out beyond their pastness, as memory that lives on, dies away, fascinates, or repels in turn. Like Spengler, he can follow these psychological metamorphoses and cultural pseudomorphoses with the descriptive stance of a life scientist, setting them within both European history’s *longue durée* and natural history’s Deep Time from an already posthuman perspective, as though adumbrating human (including gender) contingency at the dawn of the Anthropocene. Proust is keenly aware of the tension and frequent mismatch between *nomen* and *numen*—two poles that set Rosenstock-Huessy and Spengler apart in the former’s critique of the latter. But Proust consciously navigates between these poles, poetically probing names while casting them in a critical historical light. In the end though, he allows the numinous re-enchantment of unexpected *moments privilégiés* to break through the narrative crust of sequential time and fixed spaces as defined by names, giving these new life, to commune in vivid timelessness. Thus, both Proust and Rosenstock-Huessy draw from a Christian sense of sacred time that has more to do with real presence to *kairos*, at crucial moments when past and future meet *hic et nunc*, than with the appointed rounds of *chronos*, which, ironically, Spengler could only align within a standard calendar spanning all times from Christ. Proust remains consciously rooted in Europe’s Christian past, whose cultic and cultural touchstones he translates on the new spiritual plane of personal biographical

¹⁵³ For an interpretation of the common patterns of such time travel films that is significantly indebted to Jonathan Pageau’s symbolic approach to contemporary culture, see MissionTop’s video essay “*Interstellar*’s Deeper Meaning: Patterns for Obtaining a New World,” www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qu3OZmLoax4&t=155s (June 2021).

¹⁵⁴ Stünkel, “Fragen und Antworten,” 209.

experience as a reverberating, storied cathedral of time,¹⁵⁵ entrusted without fear of death to the final judgment of future readers it draws in, joining extreme subjectivity with resonant universality. This also sounds a bit like the “resurrection of truth” that would have provided a better name for Spengler’s *Decline of the West* in Rosenstock-Huessy’s early estimation. He was too quick to dismiss as decadent, on the basis of style or subject matter, Modernist writers and artists like Proust or Picasso, whose works can be read as intimations of an emerging era of diaphanous “time-freedom” showing through the fraying seams of Faustian culture and pointing to a post-modern synthesis with earlier modes of human consciousness. This is precisely what Jean Gebser (1905-1973) does. Having died the same year as Rosenstock-Huessy, he is sometimes mentioned alongside him as a guide to an integral consciousness expected to follow upon modernity.¹⁵⁶ Since his *Ever-Present Origin* (*Ursprung und Gegenwart*, 1949, 1953) also deals with Spengler in this context, it is likely in that direction that I would take further investigation of the reception and relevance of the themes laid out in *The Decline of the West*, reaching past some blind spots in Rosenstock-Huessy’s polemical engagement with them, so intimate and passionate, as lifelong personal wrestling with the formidable figure of Spengler as tempter.¹⁵⁷

References

- Barnes, Kenneth C. *Nazism, Liberalism, and Christianity: Protestant Social Thought in Germany and Great Britain, 1925-1937*. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1991.
- Brague, Rémi. *Eccentric Culture: A Theory of Western Civilization*. Translated by Samuel Lester. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2009.
- Charbonneau, Bernard. *The Year 2000* (1945, translated by Louis Cancelmi), www.signals-noise.com/2017/03/17/bernard-charbonneau-political-ecology/ (accessed July 1, 2021.)
- Cristaudo, Wayne. “Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy.” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2020 Edition), <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rosenstock-huessy/>.
- Engels, David. ““Neue” und “alte” Werte.” *Cato* 3 (2019): 24-28.
- . “Onze culturele neergang is onvermijdelijk.” *Weekblad 't Pallieterke* (September 16, 2020), <https://palnws.be/2020/09/onze-culturele-neergang-is-onvermijdelijk/>.
- Gebser, Jean. *The Ever-Present Origin*. Authorized translation by Noel Barstad with Algis Mickunas. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1989.
- Hanning, Ryan. “Development, Change and Pseudo-morphosis in the writing of Fr. Georges Florovsky and its application to the study of Peter Mohyla.” (2014), www.academia.edu/3768967/Stages_of_Pseudo-Morphosis_in_the_Writings_of_Georges_Florovsky?auto=download (accessed April 8, 2019).
- Kroesen, Otto & Wim Ravesteijn. “Between Spengler and Rosenstock-Huessy: twofold or threefold thinking within a fourfold reference framework.” Paper presented at the conference *The Communicative Construction of Transnational Political Spaces and Times*, (Bielefeld,

¹⁵⁵ See Jeremy Worthen, “The Theology of Time Regained: Eucharist, Eschatology and Resurrection,” *New Blackfriars* vol. 80, no. 945 (1999): 512-24, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43250277> (accessed February 23, 2021).

¹⁵⁶ See for instance Scott Preston’s blog The Chrysalis at <https://longsworde.wordpress.com/> (Accessed April 22, 2022).

¹⁵⁷ As this issue is coming out, I am about to bring together the views of Scott Preston, Jean Gebser and Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy in my paper “Beyond Perspectivism: Some Integral Thinkers’ Critiques of Oswald Spengler as Moral Philosopher” for the Oswald Spengler Society conference “Myth, fate, and duty. Oswald Spengler and Jordan Peterson as moral philosophers,” Blankenheimerdorf, Oct. 20 – 22, 2022, whose proceedings will appear in due course.

- January 2007), www.researchgate.net/publication/270687020_Between_Spengler_and_Rosenstock-Huessy_twofold_or_threefold_thinking_within_a_fourfold_reference_network.
- McLuhan, Marshall and Eric McLuhan. *Laws of Media. The New Science*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988.
- MissionTop. “Interstellar’s Deeper Meaning: Patterns for Obtaining a New World.” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qu3OZmLoax4&t=155s> (June 2021).
- Mohler, Armin and Karl-Heinz Weissmann. *Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918-1932. Ein Handbuch*. Graz: Ares Verlag, 2005 [1950].
- Morgan, George Allen. *Speech and Society. The Christian Linguistic Social Philosophy of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy*. With Comprehensive Bibliography by Lise van der Molen. Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1987.
- Noble, David F. *The Religion of Technology. The Divinity of Man and the Spirit of Invention*. New York: Knopf, 1997.
- Pistoi, Luca. *Corruptio optimi pessima. Istituzione e persona nel pensiero di Ivan Illich*. Turin: Università degli Studi di Torino, Scuola di Scienze Umanistiche, Corso di Laurea triennale in Filosofia, 2017 (final dissertation), https://www.academia.edu/40392120/Corruptio_Optimi_Pessima_istituzione_e_persona_nel_pensiero_di_Ivan_Illich
- Rosenstock-Huessy, Eugen. *The Christian Future: Or the Modern Mind Outrun*. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966.
- . *Dienst auf dem Planeten. Kurzweil und Langeweile im Dritten Jahrtausend*. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1965.
- . *Die Europäischen Revolutionen: Die Volkscharaktere und Staatenbildung*. Jena: Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1931; revised editions: *Die Europäischen Revolutionen und der Charakter der Nationen*. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1951, 1961; English adaptation: *Out of Revolution: Autobiography of Western Man*. New York: William Morrow & Co., 1938; Norwich, VT: Argo Books, 1969; Providence, RI: Berg Publishers, 1993.
- . “Die Gesetze der christlichen Zeitrechnung.” Die Münsteraner Vorlesungen. Sommersemester der Theologischen Fakultät der Universität Münster. 1958. 20 two-period sessions. {= Unpublished item, “Die Gesetze der Christlichen Zeitrechnung” (1982).} (Since published in book form as *Die Gesetze der christlichen Zeitrechnung*. Münsteraner Gastvorlesung an der Theologischen Fakultät der Universität Münster/Westfalen. Rudolf Hermeier & Jochen Lübbers, eds. Münster: Agenda, 2000.)
- . *Greek Philosophy* - 1956 Vol 16 - Lectures 22-23 - Jan 10 & 15, 1957. (Unpublished materials such as lecture transcripts for courses are available online at <http://www.erhfund.org/the-eugen-rosenstock-huessy-digital-archive/>.)
- . *Historiography* - 1959 Vol 20 - Lecture 08 - Apr 21, 1959.
- . *Die Hochzeit des Krieges und der Revolution*. Würzburg: Patmos Verlag, 1920.
- . *I am an Impure Thinker*. Foreword by W.H. Auden. Norwich, VT: Argo Books, 1970.
- . *Ja und Nein. Autobiographische Fragmente*. Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1968.
- . *Planetary Man. In Memoriam Oswald Spengler*. Reprinted from the *New English Weekly* of May 30th, June 6th, and June 13th, 1946.
- . “The Predicament of History.” *Journal of Philosophy* 32/ 4 (1935): 93–100.
- . *Soziologie*, Vol. II: *Die Vollzahl der Zeiten*. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1968.
- . *Speech and Reality*. Introduction by Clinton C. Gardner. Norwich, VT: Argo Books, 1970.
- . *Die Sprache des Menschengeschlechts. Eine leibhaftige Grammatik in vier Teilen. Erster Band: Erster und zweiter Teil*. Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1961.
- . *Die Sprache des Menschengeschlechts. Eine leibhaftige Grammatik in vier Teilen. Zweiter Band: Dritter und vierter Teil*. Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1964.

- Rosenstock-Huessy, Eugen, ed. *Judaism Despite Christianity. The 1916 Wartime Correspondence Between Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy and Franz Rosenzweig*. With a New Foreword by Paul Mendes-Flohr, a New Preface by Harold Stahmer, and a New Chronology by Michael Gormann-Thelen. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011.
- Rosenstock-Huessy, Eugen and Francis Squibb (unsigned). "Revolution." In *The American People's Encyclopedia*, vol. 16, 466-468. Boston: Grolier, 1962.
- Roy, Christian. "A Symbolic Meditation on Hiroshima at 75: Divine-Human Transfiguration and Transhuman Disfiguration." *The Symbolic World* (August 6, 2020), <https://thesymbolicworld.com/articles/a-symbolic-meditation-on-hiroshima-at-75-divine-human-transfiguration-and-transhuman-disfiguration/> (Accessed April 22, 2022).
- . "Europe as the Culture of Revolutions according to Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy: Probing a Western Christian Pattern with the Christian East in Mind." In *European Culture 2015, 13th edition, 29-31 October 2015, Cluj-Napoca, Conference Proceedings*, edited by Păun, Nicolae and Enrique Banús, 277-284.. Cluj-Napoca: Presa Universitară Clujeană - Editura Fundației pentru Studii Europene, 2016.
- . "Révélation et révolution : la double matrice d'une Nouvelle Pensée du langage. Note de lecture sur Wayne Cristaudo, *Religion, Redemption, and Revolution. The New Speech Thinking of Franz Rosenzweig and Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012, 590 pages." *PhaenEx* (electronic journal of the *Society for Existential and Phenomenological Theory and Culture*) vol. 11, no. 2 (2016): 239-255. <http://phaenex.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/phaenex/article/view/4783/3994>.
- . "Space, Time, and the Christian Matrix of Faustian Man". In *100 Years after the Publication of The Decline of the West: Oswald Spengler in an Age of Globalisation*, edited by David Engels, 163-188. Waltrop: Edition Sonderwege, 2021.
- Spengler, Oswald. *Der Untergang des Abendlandes – Umriss einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte*. Vol. I: *Gestalt und Wirklichkeit* Vienna: C.H. Beck, 1918.
- Stükel, Knut Martin. "Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy's Early Symblysmatic Experiences – The Sociology of *Patmos* and *Die Kreatur*." *Culture, Theory and Critique* 56/1 (2015): 13-27. DOI: 10.1080/14735784.2014.978345.
- . "Fragen und Antworten. Spenglers Sprachphilosophie: Das Neue Denken." In *Tektonik der Systeme. Neulektüren von Oswald Spengler*, edited by Arne De Winde, Sven Fabr , Sientje Maes, Bart Philipsen, Le Prince-Ev que, 197-219. Heidelberg: Synchron, 2016.
- Toynbee, Arnold J. "Christianity and Civilization." In *Civilization on Trial. Oxford University Press, 1948, as found at* <http://www.myriobiblos.gr/texts/english/toynbee.html>. (Accessed May 9 2022.)
- Worthen, Jeremy. "The Theology of Time Regained: Eucharist, Eschatology and Resurrection." *New Blackfriars* vol. 80, no. 945 (1999):512-24. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43250277> (accessed February 23, 2021).