



Clausewitz, Schmitt and the Relationship Between War and Politics in the Interwar Period and Today

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Abstract

Carl von Clausewitz distinguished two fundamental aspects of war — political and existential. These aspects are present in the philosophy of Carl Schmitt too. He used Clausewitz to build a theory of Man and his political nature that also aimed at understanding the German defeat in World War I. In this article, I interpret Schmitt's philosophy as an instance of a modern re-appropriation of Clausewitz's legacy. I aim to show that even though Schmitt's philosophy might be outdated, his way of reading Clausewitz may be inspiring today. There is a need for a 'new Schmitt' who would be able to create a system that would integrate Clausewitz's intuitions into a modern paradigm.

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DOI: 10.22618/TP.PJCv.20226.1.127.006

The PJCv Journal is published by Trivent Publishing



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Carl von Clausewitz distinguished two fundamental aspects of war — political and existential. These aspects are present in the philosophy of Carl Schmitt too. He used Clausewitz to build a theory of Man and his political nature that also aimed at understanding the German defeat in World War I. In this article, I interpret Schmitt's philosophy as an instance of a modern re-appropriation of Clausewitz's legacy. I aim to show that even though Schmitt's philosophy might be outdated, his way of reading Clausewitz may be inspiring today. There is a need for a 'new Schmitt' who would be able to create a system that would integrate Clausewitz's intuitions into a modern paradigm.

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I. Introduction

Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu are widely regarded as the two greatest war theorists of all time. Their works are read not only by researchers, historians and army officers but also by ordinary people who want to know more about strategy and further matters usually associated with war. This popularity resulted in their thought being often trivialized and simplified. It is a mistake because they are prominent thinkers who defy any attempt to pigeonhole them.

For example, Carl von Clausewitz's philosophy of war is sometimes reduced to his famous words — “War Is Merely the Continuation of Policy by Other Means.”¹ But, after a careful reading of *On War* and other works by Clausewitz, we can come to the conclusion that it is not that simple. What is more, even if we agree that the relationship between war and politics is fundamental, we can observe that the nature of this relationship changes over time.

This paper begins with the analysis of Clausewitz's political philosophy through the lens of the twentieth-century German philosopher Carl Schmitt. Then, I aim to show that we can perceive Clausewitz's thoughts as a starting point or as an inspiration to grasp the specificity of the relationship between politics and war in today's world. We do not need to read *On War* in historical perspective or just treat Clausewitz as an universal thinker. I want to show a “third way” of absorbing the Clausewitz's legacy that could enable us to use the wisdom of

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On war*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 28.

Clausewitz in the times of hybrid and proxy wars, totally different from the wars of the 18th and 19th centuries.

II. Clausewitz's political philosophy of war

In Western philosophy, there are three basic ways to think about war, namely: (1) ethics of war; (2) political philosophy of war; (3) metaphysics of war. The first one dates back to antiquity and early Christianity, the other two were developed by Clausewitz, who was trying to grasp the entirety of the phenomenon of war. His theory is so important that now it is nearly impossible to do philosophy of war without referring (whether in a critical or positive sense) to Clausewitz.

The goal of this paper is not the interpretation or analysis of the whole Clausewitzian philosophy of war. Rather, I shall draw attention to some central elements undergirding his understanding of the concept of war in order to compare them with Schmitt's philosophy of war.

In *On war*, we can find three basic definitions of war — war as “a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means,”² as “an act of force”³ and as “the collision of two living forces.”⁴ These definitions are not contradictory and indicate different aspects of the phenomenon of war. In the first definition, Clausewitz emphasizes the political nature of war. In others, he draws our attention to its metaphysical and existential aspects. Scholars like Peter Paret⁵ and Timo Pankakoski⁶ indicate that in his early works Clausewitz emphasized the existential view of war, but later he insisted more on its political, that is instrumental, features. But these two elements are present in his philosophy and should be integrated and not regarded as mutually exclusive.

A pivotal aspect of Clausewitz's theory of war is his “remarkable trinity,” which consists of violence and enmity (associated with the people); probability, chance and free action (associated with the army); and war's status as an instrument of the politicians (associated with the government).

War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.⁷

This trinity forms his explication of war's complex form. War is a fluid, unstable, and non-linear activity. Although these three tendencies are deep-rooted, they are also variable. Through his concept of the trinity, Clausewitz is trying to convey the sense that when war takes place, it always shares these same proclivities, but despite this, each war is different.

For Clausewitz, actual war is not a phenomenon to be considered apart from everything else and that would only be subjected to its very own rules. He perceives it as a political act, even if using it instrumentally is not an easy task. The idea of acts of force can be seen as an

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., 13.

⁴ Ibid., 16.

⁵ Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the state. The Man, His Theories, and His Times* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 421.

⁶ Timo Pankakoski, “Containment and intensification in political war: Carl Schmitt and the Clausewitzian heritage,” *History of European Ideas* 43/ 6 (2017): 652-653.

⁷ Clausewitz, *On war*, 30.

energetic, vital and ontological principle that gives war its impetus. However, the instrumentality, which is shown in the continuity thesis and in the third element of the trinity, provides a regulatory principle that limits these energies, which are described in the chapter about the three “extremes.”⁸

Timo Pankakoski stresses that arguing for the political nature of war is meant to tame the intensifying tendencies inherent in many wars, especially in civil and partisan wars.⁹ By contrast, Friedrich Engels and other Marxist thinkers, argued that his theory may lead to intensification of war because it justifies waging wars in the name of some ruling class interests.¹⁰

Herfried Münkler offers another interesting point of view on Clausewitz’s political philosophy of war. He identifies both political and existential views of war as a mean for the nation to become more conscious of its identity.¹¹ War is therefore perceived as the highest form of politics, rather than its instrument. Whereas in the instrumental view the political subject remains stable, the “existential” interpretation reveals war’s potential to alter historical circumstances and create new political identities.

Clausewitz’s theory leaves a lot of room for exploration and inspiration. One of the thinkers that were influenced by his philosophy of war was Carl Schmitt who also has been dedicating attention to the issue of the relationship between war and politics. Moreover, some researchers like Basil Liddell Hart¹² accused Clausewitz of propagating the phenomenon of total war, of which the Great War seemed the ultimate manifestation. It is therefore very interesting to see how Carl Schmitt, a philosopher that was active during and after World War I, regarded Clausewitz’s theory.

III. Carl Schmitt and Post-War Germany

Schmitt is well known for his theory of political antagonism. In *The Concept of the Political*, he argues that, by nature, people are divided into two groups, namely the friends and the enemies: that is the primary political distinction. It is important to underline that the enemy is not only a competitor or rival, but also poses a real existential threat both for individuals and communities. Schmitt’s whole theory of the state is built on this idea.

The specific political distinction, to which political actions and motives can be reduced, is that between friend and enemy. This provides a definition in the sense of a criterion and not as an exhaustive definition or one indicative of substantial content. Insofar, as it is not derived from other criteria, the antithesis of friend and enemy corresponds to the relatively independent criteria of other antitheses: good and evil in the moral sphere, beautiful and ugly in the aesthetic sphere, and so on.¹³

Schmitt is a supporter of strong sovereign power and total state unity. In his opinion, the sovereign, the head of state, is the one who can decide to suspend the functioning of the law or to introduce a state of emergency. He possesses also another crucial prerogative — he can

⁸ Ibid., 13-20.

⁹ Pankakoski, “Containment and intensification in political war”, 653.

¹⁰ See Azar Gat, “Clausewitz and the Marxists: Yet Another Look,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 27/ 2 (1992): 372.

¹¹ Herfried Münkler, *Über den Krieg. Stationen der Kriegsgeschichte im Spiegel ihrer theoretischen Reflexion* (Weilerswist-Metternich: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2008), 105-15.

¹² Basil H. Liddell Hart, *The Ghost of Napoleon* (London: Faber and Faber, 1933), 120.

¹³ Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, trans. Georg Schwab (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 26.

decide who is the friend and who is the enemy, he can also make the most important political decisions. This is why Schmitt's philosophy is also known under the term "decisionism." All remaining activities of the sovereign power may be reduced to staying ready to fight the enemy, even if war never outbreaks.

Still, for Schmitt the war is "an armed combat between organized political entities"¹⁴ and the "most extreme consequence of enmity."¹⁵ Nonetheless, his political philosophy is sometimes misunderstood. Schmitt is not a warmonger. He only claims that permanent existential danger is inherent in human nature and that the state needs to be ready to fight in order to survive. War is neither a goal nor an ideal of politics. It is only one of the possible consequences of choosing an enemy. However, this does not change the fact that, according to Schmitt's theory, the real possibility of fighting to the death, which results from the distinction between friends and enemies, is a condition for the emergence of any politics.

War is still today the most extreme possibility. One can say that the exceptional case has an especially decisive meaning which exposes the core of the matter. For only in real combat is revealed the most extreme consequence of the political grouping of friend and enemy. From this most extreme possibility human life derives its specifically political tension. A world in which the possibility of war is utterly eliminated, a completely pacified globe, would be a world without the distinction of friend and enemy and hence a world without politics.¹⁶

The German philosopher postulated the absolute unity of the state. Regardless of whether the state is a democracy, oligarchy or dictatorship, it should always be led by one will. He was a fervent opponent of parliamentarism and liberal democracy.¹⁷

To understand Schmitt's philosophy correctly, it is important to look at the historical circumstances in which he created his theory. The works I am referring to were written in the interwar period. It was a difficult time in the history of Germany when the nation was trying to shake off after its defeat in World War I. This aim at national recovery was impeded by an economic crisis which was further worsened by the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Many people wanted to know who was responsible for the defeat, since at the end of the war the German army was still in enemy territory.

One of the most popular theories was the Stab-in-the-back myth [*Dolchstoßlegende*]. According to this theory, the military failure was the result of the "betrayal" of the Socialists and Social Democrats, who started the revolution and led to the abdication of the Kaiser.¹⁸ Today we know that in 1918 the situation on the front was critical,¹⁹ but in the Weimar Republic the myth of the invincible German Army was very strong.

Carl Schmitt's theory of internal enemy is in principle in line with the Stab-in-the-back myth. And the postulate of absolute state unity may be perceived as an attempt to avoid a defeat in the future. This may also help us to understand Schmitt's decision to back Hitler and the National Socialists with their idea of the 'Führer.' Of course, I do not want to reduce Schmitt's philosophy to these historical circumstances. However, it is very likely that the historical period he lived in was a great inspiration and an important point of reference for

¹⁴ Ibid., 32.

¹⁵ Ibid., 33.

¹⁶ Ibid., 35.

¹⁷ See Carl Schmitt, *Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2017 [1923]).

¹⁸ See Boris Barth, *Dolchstoßlegenden und politische Desintegration. Das Trauma der deutschen Niederlage im Ersten Weltkrieg 1914-1933* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2003).

¹⁹ See Alexander Watson, *Enduring the Great War. Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and British Armies, 1914-1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 184-231.

him. This interpretation is held by, among other scholars, Joseph W. Bendersky who analyzed Schmitt's work from a psychological perspective.

The search for security, that many would later identify as an underlying principle of his political and legal theory, was far more than a reaction to the decades of crises and cataclysms following World War I. It was intrinsic to his personality and mental framework long before the outbreak of war. He was not a heroic figure challenging the world but was someone who recoiled from it, seeking escape or protection from the pressures, dangers, and vicissitudes of life. Probably the most reoccurring phrase throughout his diaries is *Angst vor* (fear of, or worried about). Such a mindset of doubt and fear is not conducive to optimism in political thought.²⁰

Schmitt's theories were very influential in inter-war Germany. But what is the relationship between his thought and that of Clausewitz?

IV. Schmitt and Clausewitz: Similarities and Differences

This brief reconstruction of Schmitt's political philosophy shows that he touches many issues that were analyzed by Clausewitz and agrees that war and politics are interconnected. Nonetheless, he does not refer to the author of *On War* very often. His most famous remark on Clausewitz comes from the first version of *The Concept of the Political*.

War is not "the continuation of politics by other means" as the famous definition is mostly cited; [war] is naturally not the aim and purpose of politics either, but the presupposition (that is always present as a genuine possibility) that determines human action in a characteristic way and gives it a specific political meaning.²¹

This remark could make us think that Schmitt simply rejects one of the most important ideas of Clausewitz — the continuity thesis. But if we consider it in a broader context, we will come to the conclusion that Schmitt's philosophy of war is actually similar to Clausewitz's and that the thoughts of the former might be even perceived as an active reception of the latter's legacy that no German war theorists could ignore. Moreover, in his *Politik* (1936), Schmitt shows a different attitude towards the continuity thesis. In this text, he describes war as "a continuation of political interaction with involvement of different means."²² Also, in the second version of *The Concept of the Political* the above-mentioned remark about Clausewitz was altered:

The military battle itself is not the "continuation of politics by other means" as the famous term of Clausewitz is generally incorrectly cited. War has its own strategic, tactical, and other rules and points of view, but they all presuppose that the political decision has already been made as to who the enemy is.²³

We can agree that both philosophers distinguish between war and politics and they both perceive the former as an instrument of the latter. This is acknowledged by Schmitt in one of the paragraphs of *The Concept of the Political*.

²⁰ Joseph W. Bendersky, "Schmitt's Diaries," in *The Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt*, ed. Jens Meierhenrich and Oliver Simons (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 121-122.

²¹ Carl Schmitt, "Der Begriff des Politischen," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 58 (1927): 8. As cited in Timo Pankakoski, "Containment and intensification in political war," 657.

²² Carl Schmitt, "Politik," in *Staat, Grossraum, Nomos: Arbeiten aus den Jahren 1916-1969*, ed. Günter Maschke (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1995), 137.

²³ Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, trans. Georg Schwab, 33-34.

War as the most extreme political means discloses the possibility which underlies every political idea, namely, the distinction of friend and enemy. This makes sense only as long as this distinction in mankind is actually present or at least potentially possible.²⁴

This fragment shows that Schmitt's reflections about the relationship between war and politics is based on his more general anthropological thesis, that is, on the distinction between friend and enemy. This raises a new important question: Do Clausewitz and Schmitt share similar anthropological assumptions?

Enmity, a crucial category of Schmitt's philosophy, has its place in Clausewitz's system. It is an element of the trinity. However, the author of *On War* understands this enmity in a different way than Schmitt. For Schmitt, enmity lays the foundations of politics. For Clausewitz enmity is to be regarded as "a blind natural force,"²⁵ which should be constrained by the political, by the sphere of "reason alone."²⁶ We can therefore see that Schmitt and Clausewitz may agree that human nature encompasses some kind of enmity, but there is a disagreement as to how deeply this enmity is rooted in the political sphere. Timo Pankakoski holds the view that Schmitt's "idea of political war may be read as a radicalized version of Clausewitz's theory rather than a strict deviation"²⁷ and I see this as a very interesting point. The author of *The Concept of the Political* is trying to show that enmity is present not only on the level of the people but also on the level of the government.

However, this is not the only point on which Schmitt and Clausewitz might disagree on the anthropological and political level. Let us look at the problem of the nature of enmity as such. Of course, Schmitt acknowledges that enmity contains some kind of existential and irrational aspects, which brings him closer to Clausewitz. However, the matter is more complicated than it might first seem.

There exists no rational purpose, no norm no matter how true, no program no matter how exemplary, no social ideal no matter how beautiful, no legitimacy nor legality which could justify men in killing each other for this reason. If such physical destruction of human life is not motivated by an existential threat to one's own way of life, then it cannot be justified. Just as little can war be justified by ethical and juristic norms. If there really are enemies in the existential sense as meant here, then it is justified, but only politically, to repel and fight them physically.²⁸

Nonetheless, his whole idea of sovereignty, is based on the assumption that the sovereign is able to decide who is the friend and who is the enemy. There is a tension between these two visions of enmity. On the one hand, enmity is rooted in human nature, as it denotes the utmost degree of intensity of separation. But, on the other hand, friend-enemy relationships are subjects of political decisions. And this second meaning of enmity seems to be more important for Schmitt. For Clausewitz, enmity does not play such an important role on a political level. In that regard, he remains close to the philosophy of the Enlightenment in that he believes that the political sphere is the sphere of rationality.

Nevertheless, there is some sort of similarity between these two points of view, because for Schmitt subjecting a friend-enemy relationship to the sphere of the political was aimed to prevent civil wars and other uncontrollable outbursts of violence. He does not believe that

²⁴ Ibid., 35-36.

²⁵ Clausewitz, *On war*, 30.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Pankakoski, "Containment and intensification in political war," 650.

²⁸ Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, 49.

war can be rational, but he believes in the authority of the sovereign power. The goal is actually similar.

V. Reading Clausewitz in a Schmittian Way

Schmitt's philosophy of war may therefore be considered as a radicalized version of Clausewitz's theory. Schmitt was living in turbulent times between two world wars and was critical of some events that occurred in the interwar period — for instance, the foundation of the League of Nations and the rise of U.S. imperialism which he understood as a fake universalism meant to undermine Germany's status.

He created a political philosophy that would help him to fight these new tendencies and presented an alternative way of understanding the new reality of the 20th century. This political philosophy was indebted to two thinkers, namely Thomas Hobbes²⁹ and Carl von Clausewitz. The former was Schmitt's inspiration for decisionism and state unity, and the latter was his main inspiration for his philosophy of war and enmity. It should be noted, however, that Schmitt was not an epigone. He draws a creative inspiration from other thinkers in order to create a new philosophy. A philosophy that was supposed to give some answers to the most urgent questions regarding the nature of the state and of Man.

Ultimately, his philosophy, or at least the positive program based on decisionism and total unity of the state was rejected. After World War II thinking about the political in the context of enmity and absolute state unity was not welcome. The international order changed too. The world became dominated by two blocks and even in Europe the role of nation states was diminished. Schmitt's theory became outdated.

He tried to adjust his philosophy to this new context in his essay *Theory of the Partisan*,³⁰ but it was not as groundbreaking as his early works, and, at least in my opinion, it failed to reach the essence of the post-war reality. In this work, he claimed, on the one hand, that the partisan was obliterating the distinctions of regularity and irregularity or legality and illegality and aggravating the blurred intermediate state. On the other hand, Schmitt depicted the partisan as having truly political enemies and reflecting the utmost intensity of political engagement. And to make it even more complicated, he made partisanship a manifestation of the political in the era of liberal de-politicization. We can say that he wanted to analyze the new reality in old terms, which was doomed to failure from the outset.

Even if we admit that both his first and his second attempt to create a philosophy of war were a failure,³¹ we can still learn something from Schmitt today. However, this does not directly pertain to the contents of Schmitt's philosophy, but to his particular way of thinking and using other philosophers as an inspiration.

In today's world, war as such is denied as a legitimate instrument of state's foreign policy and it is exactly what Schmitt was afraid of. Even partisanship no longer plays the significant role it had during the cold war. However, we cannot say that we are living in the era of 'perpetual peace.' There are still many conflicts in many regions of the world, including Europe. Could Clausewitz still be a constructive philosophical inspiration and help us understand this complicated political reality?

²⁹ Carl Schmitt, *Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2015 [1938]).

³⁰ Carl Schmitt, *Theorie des Partisanen. Zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des Politischen* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2006 [1963]).

³¹ For more detailed critic of Schmitt's philosophy of war see Benno Teschke, "Carl Schmitt's Concepts of War: A Categorical Failure," in *The Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt*, ed. Jens Meierhenrich and Oliver Simons, 117-146.

I think the answer is yes. We have to come back to the roots of Clausewitz's thought in order to create a new philosophy of war. I do not have such a coherent theory, but I can indicate some starting points.

Let us go back to the trinity. Schmitt is focused on the element of enmity, but in my opinion, now we should focus on the element of policy which Clausewitz associates with reason. And one of the goals of the modern liberal philosophy is to associate policy with reason, as well, specifically with so called 'public reason.' We can find this association in the works of, among others, John Rawls³² and Jürgen Habermas.³³ The diktat of public reason makes traditional war almost impossible. Because of that war has to take the form of a humanitarian or peacekeeping operation. Today's ethics-centered philosophy of war may be regarded as a symptom of the liberal rationalization and moralization of politics. But such a statement cannot exhaust this gigantic topic. After all, this rationalization of politics and war has never fully succeeded.

This is the point where we may get back to Schmitt. His enmity-centered political philosophy might be false, but his warning that liberalism can only overshadow the enmity between people, but not overcome it, is still relevant today.³⁴ The new philosophy of war I have in mind may be reason-centered, but it has to find some balance between the three elements of Clausewitz's trinity, a balance that could help us to understand the modern political reality and the attitude towards war it brings forth. Interestingly, this point of view is backed by Clausewitz, who writes:

A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless. Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.³⁵

Carl Schmitt was trying to find this balance in the 20th century and now we will have to find this balance again in our 21st century. Finally, it should be kept in mind that even if this balance is found, it still has to be integrated into a wider and coherent political philosophy.³⁶

VI. Conclusion

In his famous work *Clausewitz: Philosopher of war* Raymond Aron remarks that "you can find what you want to find in the Treatise: all that you need is a selection of quotations, supported by personal prejudice."³⁷ To some extent this complaint is of course justified, but I am convinced that it does not have to be a very bad thing as long as we are not trying to show

³² See John Rawls, *The law of peoples*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999) and idem, *Political liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

³³ See Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981).

³⁴ Chantal Mouffe, a modern leftist philosopher, is known for her criticism of liberalism and critical use of the work of Carl Schmitt in proposing a radicalization of modern democracy — what she calls "agonistic pluralism," which is a reinterpretation of Schmitt's distinction between the friend and the enemy. See *The Challenge of Carl Schmitt*, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London and New York: Verso, 1999).

³⁵ Clausewitz, *On war*, 31.

³⁶ René Girard proposed another way of reading Clausewitz and tried to accommodate Clausewitzian intuitions with his own anthropological theories of scapegoat and mimetic desire. He states that modern warfare comes to the utmost level of escalation, which political institutions are unable to contain. The French anthropologist issues a warning about the apocalyptic threats hanging over our world. See René Girard, *Achever Clausewitz* (Paris: Carnets Nord, 2007).

³⁷ Raymond Aron, *Clausewitz: Philosopher of war*, trans. Christine Booker and Norman Stone (London: Routledge, 1983), 235.

that Clausewitz's idea is the same as ours. Rather, we should treat his views as an inspiration for creating our own theory.

This is what Schmitt did. Even if his philosophy was in many ways similar to Clausewitz's, he did not try to use an authority of the author of *On War* as a justification for his claims. He was inspired by Clausewitz, but he was not an epigone. He clarified his own position through his own inner intellectual debate with Clausewitz's theory. It is my contention that such an attitude should be followed today.

Clausewitz's theory of war, especially his "remarkable trinity" and the continuation thesis, seems to be a good basis for different philosophies of war. Carl Schmitt was trying to use these concepts to create his own philosophy in the interwar period, believing that it corresponded to the nature of war and politics of that time. I believe that we have a similar task for today too. Modern wars and modern political reality are dauntingly complicated, but Clausewitz's legacy might be a good inspiration not only for strategy, but also for philosophy.

Books such as *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*³⁸ are therefore very important, but from my point of view, this is only a first step towards a new philosophy of war. What we need is a 'new Schmitt.' We need someone who will not only indicate how we can use Clausewitz today, but who will also integrate his philosophy into a new paradigm that would better correspond to the current reality of war.

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³⁸ *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

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